Essays in Economics of Innovation by Sidorkin, Oleg
CERGE
Center for Economics Research and Graduate Education 
Charles University
Essays in Economics of Innovation
O leg S id o rk in
Dissertation
Prague, March 29, 2017

D isserta tion  C om m ittee
Patrick GaulÉ (CERGE-EI, Charles University; Chair)
JAN HANOUSEK (CERGE-EI, Charles University)
Martin Srholec (CERGE-EI, Charles University; Lund University) 
KREŠIMIR ŽlGIČ (CERGE-EI, Charles University)
Referees
Christian Fons-Rosen (Universitat Pompeu Fabra) 
FRANCESCO Lissoni (Universitě de Bordeaux)
ii
Contents
A b stract v
A bstrakt vii
A cknow ledgm ents ix
1 Surviving th e  tim es o f crisis: D oes innovation m ake a difference? 1
1.1 Introduction.....................................................................................................  1
1.2 The innovation-survival connection: What should we expect?....................  3
1.3 D a ta .................................................................................................................. 6
1.4 M o d e l............................................................................................................... 11
1.5 Results............................................................................................................... 16
1.6 Conclusion........................................................................................................  21
1. A A p p en d ix ........................................................................................................  23
l.A .l Definitions............................................................................................  23
l.A .2 BEEPS dataset methodology ..........................................................  26
1. A.3 FCS dataset m ethodology................................................................  28
2 T he im pact o f m anagem ent quality  on th e innovation  perform ance of
firms in em erging countries 33
2.1 Introduction.....................................................................................................  33
2.2 Literature rev ie w ............................................................................................  34
2.3 M o d e l............................................................................................................... 37
2.4 D a ta .................................................................................................................. 38
2.5 Results............................................................................................................... 44
2.5.1 Industry z-score normalization..........................................................  49
2.5.2 Quality asymmetry a n a ly sis .............................................................  50
2.6 Conclusion........................................................................................................  52
2. A A p p en d ix ........................................................................................................  53
2. A.1 Summary S tatistics............................................................................. 53
2.A.2 Management Practices: Core Questions............................................. 55
2.A.3 MOI sampling m ethodology.............................................................  59
2.A.4 Merging MOI and ORBIS d a ta s e ts .................................................  60
iii
3 P o litic a l R isk , In fo rm a tio n  a n d  C o rru p tio n  C ycles: E v id en ce  fro m  R u s ­
s ian  R eg io n s 61
3.1 Introduction.....................................................................................................  61
3.2 Corruption Cycles in R u ss ia .......................................................................... 64
3.3 Empirical A n a ly sis .........................................................................................  70
3.3.1 Background.........................................................................................  70
3.3.2 D a ta .....................................................................................................  71
3.3.3 Baseline Model: Identification..........................................................  72
3.4 Baseline Model: R e s u l ts ................................................................................  75
3.4.1 Retired vs. Re-Appointed G overnors..............................................  84
3.4.2 Meetings with the P residen t.............................................................  88
3.5 Conclusion........................................................................................................  91
3.A A p p en d ix .......................................................................................................  93
3.A.1 BEEPS dataset methodology ...........................................................  96
B ib lio g ra p h y  99
iv
A bstract
This dissertation deals with topics related to innovation, management quality, politi­
cal economy and corruption. In Chapter 1 (which is co-authored by Martin Srholec), 
we econometrically test the hypothesis that pre-crisis innovation affected firms’ survival 
odds and performance thereafter using a unique micro dataset of shareholding companies 
from emerging countries in Eastern and Southern Europe derived from the World Bank’s 
Enterprise Surveys. Overall, the results indicate that the innovation-survival connection 
holds. Nevertheless, firms identified as those that innovated excessively before the crisis 
turned out to be far more likely to die, whereas cautious innovators came out better off. 
Firms that stretched their resources too much, or that were too bold, faced dire conse­
quences. If an appetite for risky innovation is sociably desirable and the crisis weeds out 
viable businesses, including those that may drive the recovery, there is a role for public 
policy to mitigate the short-lived selection inefficiencies that proliferate during severe 
recessions.
In Chapter 2 we study the impact of management quality on the innovation input and 
output of firms in ten emerging countries using data from the Management, Organization 
and Innovation (MOI) Survey. We find the effects of management quality on the decisions 
of firms to invest in R&D hold for both EU and non-EU emerging countries. An improve­
ment in management quality from the 25th percentile to the median is associated with a 
3.3 percentage point increase in the propensity to invest in R&D. Furthermore, there are 
positive but weak effects of management quality on product innovation. The empirical 
results for individual management practices show that the quality of incentive manage­
ment is intimately connected with innovation performance. The quality of monitoring 
management is related to higher inputs into innovation, but not to innovation output. 
The quality of incentive management is related to higher input into innovation, but not 
to innovation output. All results hold after controlling for differences in management 
quality by industries. Additional analysis of management quality asymmetry shows that 
the results are driven mainly by firms with low quality management.
In Chapter 3 (which is co-authored by Dmitriy Vorobyev) we study the topic of polit­
ical budget cycles in which opportunistic politicians systematically adjust public policies 
prior to elections in order to attract a higher number of votes. We show that the cor­
rupt behavior of politicians also follows certain patterns which are driven by electoral 
cycles. Based on Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey data, ex­
ploiting variation in the dates of surveys and in the length and starting date of Russian
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regional governors’ terms, we find that corruption levels, as perceived by firms operat­
ing in different regions of Russia, increase closer to the expected expiration date of a 
regional governor’s term. We argue that the Russian political system allows governors to 
accumulate private information about their likelihood of remaining in office for another 
term. Therefore, they know well in advance of elections if they will continue in office 
for the next term. We suggest that the accumulation of such information may serve as 
an explanation for the observed pattern of perceived corruption: if a governor gradually 
learns that he will not be re-elected once the current term has expired he has increasing 
incentives to engage in corrupt activities in order to accumulate wealth before he leaves 
office. We formalize this idea with a simple empirical model and test it. We find that in 
regions where incumbent governors are less likely to remain in office for the next term, 
corruption increases over their terms, while in regions where governors are more likely to 
remain in office, perceived corruption follows a decreasing trend.
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A bstrakt
V této disertační práci jsou zkoumány různé aspekty inovací, kvality managementu, pol­
itické ekonomie a korupce. V první kapitole, společné s Martinem Srholcem, ekonomet- 
ricky testujeme hypotézu, že inovace zavedené před finanční krizí ovlivnily pravděpodob­
nost přežití firem a jejich následnou výkonnost. Pro tyto účely byly použity unikátní 
údaje o podnicích v rozvíjejících se zemích východní a jižní Evropy, získané z průzkumu 
Světové banky. Výsledky obecně potvrzují vazbu mezi inovacemi a přežitím finanční 
krize. Nicméně firmy, které byly identifikovány jako nadměrní inovátoři, měly během 
krize mnohem větší pravděpodobnost úmrtí, zatímco opatrní inovátoři na tom byli lépe. 
Firmy, které se přepjaly, které byly před krizí ohledně inovací příliš smělé, dosáhly 
horších výsledků. Pokud jsou inovace zdrojem ekonomického blahobytu a pokud krize 
ničí jinak životaschopné inovační projekty, včetně těch, které mohou táhnout následnou 
hospodářskou obnovu, otevírá se prostor pro veřejné politiky v podobě snahy zmírnit 
dopady těchto tržních nedokonalostí, které se projevují během hlubokých recesí.
Ve druhé kapitole je empiricky zkoumán vliv kvality managementu na vstupy a výsledky 
inovací. Použita jsou firemních data z deseti rozvíjejících se zemí, která byla získána z 
Setření o řízení, organizaci a inovacích (MOI). Výsledky potvrzují propojení kvality man­
agementu a rozhodnutí firem investovat do výzkumu a vývoje (VaV) jak v zemích EU 
tak i v rozvíjejících se zemích mimo EU. Zlepšení kvality managementu od 25. percentilu 
k mediánu je spojeno s nárůstem pravděpodobností investovat do VaV o 3,3 procent­
ních bodů. Navíc existují pozitivní, i když slabé, účinky kvality managementu na sklon 
k zavedení produktové inovace. Empirické výsledky pro jednotlivé manažerské prak­
tiky ukazují, že kvalita motivačního managementu je úzce spojena s inovační výkonností. 
Kvalita monitorovacího managementu sice nesouvisí s inovacemi produktů, ale vede k 
vyššímu objemem VaV investic.
Ve třetí kapitole spolu s Dmitrijem Vorobyevem zkoumáme vztah mezi korupci a 
délkou trvání vládního období politiků. Tady ukazujeme, že zkorumpované chování poli­
tiků sleduje určité modely, dané volebními cykly. Na základě mezinárodního průzkumu 
podnikatelského prostředí a podnikové výkonnosti (BEEPS), s využitím časové variace 
dat v průzkumech a variace v délce a termínu zahájení vládního období ruských guberná- 
torň, zjišťujeme, že se úroveň korupce, tak jak je vnímána firmami, které působí v různých 
oblastech Ruska, zvyšuje blíže k předpokládanému datu ukončení funkčního období gu- 
bernátora. Tvrdíme, že ruský politický systém umožňuje gubernátorům shromažďovat 
soukromé informace o pravděpodobnosti jejich setrvání v úřadu na další období, a to
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v dostatečném předstihu před volbami. Ukazujeme, že akumulace takových informací 
může sloužit jako vysvětlení pro pozorované jevy vnímané korupce: jestliže gubernátor 
postupně zjistí, že po vypršení aktuálního volebního období opustí úřad, jeho motivace 
zapojit se do korupčních aktivit se zvyšuje kvůli shromažďování bohatství předtím, než 
bude mimo hru. Tuto myšlenku formalizujeme pomocí jednoduchého empirického mod­
elu a testujeme ho. Zjistili jsme, že v oblastech, kde je méně pravděpodobné, že úřadující 
gubernátoři zůstanou ve funkci na další období, se korupce v jejích funkčním období 
zvyšuje, zatímco v regionech, kde je větší pravděpodobnost, že gubernátoři zůstanou ve 
funkci, vnímaná korupce vykazuje klesající trend.
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C h ap te r  1
Surviving the times of crisis: does innovation 
make a difference?
1 Co-authored with Martin Srholec.
1.1 In tro d u c tio n
Much has been written about the economic crisis that shook the foundations of the global 
economy in 2008. Although its massive impact on employment, productivity, the growth 
of firms, and the economy as a whole has been well documented by national statistics, 
only recently detailed micro datasets have started to surface indicating how exactly the 
crisis affected the operation of companies and what the main factors were that helped 
them to weather the downturn. This provides new opportunities for investigating, with 
the benefit of hindsight the consequences of the crisis on selection dynamics, including the 
innovation-survival relationthip. The sheer scale of the crisis caught most economists, in­
cluding managers of prominent companies, caught the sheer scale of the crisis by surprise. 
Companies were not prepared to face this slump. Managers quickly found themselves 
struggling for the survival of their establishments. Yet fortune favors the prepared mind.
XA previous version of this paper was published in International Journal of Technological Learning, 
Innovation and Development, 7, 124-146. Source of the microdata is Enterprise Surveys, The World 
Bank Group. Financial support from the Czech Science Foundation (GACR) project P402/10/2310 on 
‘Innovation, productivity and policy: What can we learn from micro data?’ and institutional support 
RVO 67985998 from the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic is gratefully acknowledged. We 
thank Patrick Gaulé, Robert van der Have, Štěpán Jurajda, Caroline Paunov for fruitful comments. All 
errors remaining in this text are the responsibility of the authors.
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Some companies no doubt were in a better position to cope with the crisis than others. 
Was innovation a relevant part of this equation and in which direction? Could it be that 
while innovation generally boosts survival odds, too much exposure turns toxic in hard 
times like these? What lessons in terms of the importance of innovation should we learn 
from the recent crisis?
Filippetti and Archibugi (2011) is an early example of a study based on micro data that 
addressed the impact of the crisis and found that human resources, specialization patterns 
and the quality of the financial system were the main national factors offsetting the 
impact on the innovation investments of firms. Likewise, Cincera et al. (2010) examined 
the impact of the crisis on the R&D budgets of large European firms and found a general 
pro-cyclical tendency. Paunov (2012) confirmed that the crisis led many firms to stop 
innovation projects in Latin America. Papers by Archibugi, Filippetti, and Frenz (2013a), 
and Archibugi, Filippetti, and Frenz (2013b) concluded that with some notable exceptions 
the crisis generally undermined the willingness of firms to invest in innovation. However, 
much less is known about the impact of innovation on the way firms fared in terms of their 
survival and general economic performance during the crisis. The aim of this paper is to 
help fill the gap. The main interest is not in what happened to innovation activity during 
the crisis, but rather whether pre-crisis innovation efforts made a difference thereafter, and 
whether the otherwise positive innovation-survival relationship continued to hold during 
the crisis. Using a unique micro dataset of shareholding companies from Eastern and 
Southern Europe derived from the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys, we econometrically 
test the hypothesis that the lagged innovativeness of firms affected their performance 
during the crisis.
More specifically, we estimate an empirical model which revolves around the connec­
tion between pre-crisis innovation output, given by sales of new products and services, 
and the odds of surviving the crisis. At the center is the distinction between what we call 
’excessive’ and ’cautious’ innovation, which is derived from the (mis)balance between the 
observed innovation output on one hand and structural features, technological capabili­
ties, market, industry and country conditions under which firms operate on the other. In 
the main equation of interest, therefore, we estimate the impact of actual innovativeness 
and the tendency to excessive versus cautious innovation on firms’ survival. In addition, 
we also test for the impact on the sales growth of the survivors.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 considers theoretical arguments 
and reviews existing evidence on the innovation-survival connection during recessions.
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Section 3 presents the micro dataset, explains the variables and provides a brief descriptive 
overview of the sample. Section 4 outlines the model and debates methodological issues. 
Section 5 provides results of the econometric estimates. Section 6 concludes with policy 
implications.
1.2 T he innovation-surv ival connection: W h a t should 
we expect?
According to the conventional Schumpeterian view following the seminal contribution of 
Schumpeter (2013), the survival of innovators improves economic performance by ’creative 
destruction’ processes, including what has been dubbed the ’cleansing effect’ of recession, 
as innovators drive out from the market less dynamic competitors. Empirical evidence on 
this topic seems to strongly confirm the notion that innovativeness provides advantage. 
Peltoniemi (2011), for example, found in an extensive survey of the industry life-cycle 
literature that there is plentiful support for the positive innovation-survival relationship.
During severe recessions, however, the selection dynamics favoring innovators could 
be broken by the disruptive forces of the crisis. For it is not necessarily the strongest, 
largest, most sophisticated, or most innovative, but plainly the fittest that prevails in 
the evolutionary struggle for survival and definition of the fittest can be fundamentally 
twisted during cataclysmic events. During a crisis, there are at least five forces pulling 
selection against innovators, most of which unfortunately for them tend to amplify each 
other.
The first and most obvious mechanism is that a sharp downturn in aggregate de­
mand is accompanied with compositional shifts in favor of cheaper, simpler and possibly 
technologically less advanced solutions. In other words, in line with the well-known En­
gel’s law, demand for new products and services that tend to have high income elasticity 
of demand contracts even more than for others, rendering innovators less competitive. 
Moreover, this is further reinforced by the so-called ’sullying’ effect described by Barlevy 
(2002) that works through the labor market, according to which recession favors low-paid 
and temporary jobs.
Second, and symptomatic of the recent crisis, is that liquidity in financial markets 
becomes constrained, which can trigger negative selection of innovators due to possible 
financial market failures. Barlevy (2003) argues that in the presence of credit market fric-
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tions, during recession resources might be reallocated from more efficient to less efficient 
uses if more efficient production arrangements are more vulnerable to credit constraints. 
If firms that are more innovative tend to borrow more and innovation incurs heavy in­
vestments financed by borrowings, then firms are also more severely affected by a credit 
crunch. Easy access to credit for innovative firms when business goes well, when creditors 
recognize their superior long-term growth prospects, can turn from sweet to sour when 
credit dries out.
Third, and an intimately related reason, is that as Sutton (1991) reminds us invest­
ment in innovation is generally a sunk cost, an idiosyncratic asset, which is difficult to 
convert into cash arises in a liquidity-constrained economy.
Fourth, recessions bring a ’scarring’ effect (Ouyang 2009), according to which idiosyn­
cratic productivity is not directly observable and can only be learned over time. Thus, 
potentially superior but inherently uncertain innovative ventures might be terminated 
during hard times because their owners (or financiers) cannot support them long enough 
to learn that they are viable. Finally, Paunov (2012) warns that governments tend to 
withdraw support for innovative firms due to budget cuts during a crisis, making investors 
more likely to abandon the innovation projects.
Generally, therefore, over the long term innovative firms are more likely to survive, but 
there are also credible reasons to expect that over the short term selection can produce 
remarkably inefficient outcomes Advantages over the long term can suddenly turn lethal 
dragging innovative firms into an abyss. Hence, the central hypothesis of this paper 
is that the positive selection of innovators breaks down, or even reverses to negative, 
during a particularly severe recession that goes far beyond the usual ups and downs of 
the business cycle. According to this thesis, innovation can turn into a fatal burden if 
the timing is unfortunate, the firm becomes too exposed to the associated risks and the 
firm innovates excessively just before the crisis hits.
Analysis of the relationship between innovation and performance has a long history. 
Traditionally, this has been studied at the macro level, but more recent studies have 
emerged that attempt to disentangle this relationship at the micro level. Crepon, Duguet, 
and Mairesse (1998) proposed a model, inspired by the earlier literature on technical 
change, knowledge production function and R&D spillovers (Griliches 1990), which con­
siders in a sequential way links between inputs to the innovation process, innovation 
outputs and labour productivity. Adaptations of this so-called CDM model have been es­
timated on micro data from a number of countries (for surveys see OECD 2009; Mairesse
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and Mohnen 2010). Overall, the results seem to confirm the assumed relationships.
As far the specific innovation-survival connection is concerned, there is a large number 
of survival studies that take into account the technological intensity of industry. However, 
because there is substantial industry heterogeneity in innovation (Srholec and Verspagen 
2012), industry is quite unsatisfactory for determining on what happens at the firm-level. 
Econometric evidence on the survival of innovators based directly on micro data is less 
extensive, and does not contain evidence on whether this connection continues to hold 
during major crises.
Four studies deserve to be mentioned in particular. Cefis and Marsili (2006) used evi­
dence from a large sample of manufacturing firms in the Netherlands, for which evidence 
on innovation was obtained from the second Community Innovation Survey (CIS) over 
1996-1998. The main finding is that firms benefit from an innovation premium for sur­
vival, regardless of whether the innovation indicator is a dummy, innovation expenditure 
or R&D expenditure and regardless of the size or age category of firms. Hence, there 
seems to be overwhelming support for the positive innovation-survival connection, but 
unfortunately the study is silent on the underlying macroeconomic conditions.
Nishimura, Nakajima, and Kiyota (2005), however, used a comprehensive firm-level 
panel dataset from Japan to focus directly on determining the extent to which selection 
mechanisms worked properly during the banking-crisis of 1996-1997. The results showed 
that efficient firms in terms of total factor productivity died while inefficient ones survived. 
Based on the evidence in hand, they concluded that selection tends to malfunction in 
severe recessions. Although they did not measure technology (or innovation) directly, the 
paper needs to be acknowledged for providing rare insights on the disruptive impacts of 
a major crisis.
Likewise, using micro data from Indonesian manufacturing over 1991-2001, Hallward- 
Driemeier and Rijkers (2013) rejected the thesis that the East Asian crisis improved the 
allocative process. The study shows that the crisis destroyed relatively productive firms 
and thus the cleansing effect did not prevail. Firms more vulnerable to credit market 
conditions were found to be more likely to exit. After the crisis, however, the positive 
relationship between productivity and survival was restored and new entrants became 
much more productive on average. Hence, the attenuation of the protective power of 
productivity against exit was limited to the crisis period.
Finally, Fernandes and Paunov (2014) examined the connection between innovation 
and survival based on micro evidence from Chilean manufacturing plants over 1996-
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2006. The results confirm that innovating plants generally have a lower hazard of death, 
but only innovators that retain diversified sources of revenue survive significantly longer, 
while risky innovators - in the sense of innovating a single product - are actually more 
likely to exit. Hence, cautious innovators are better off. Although, the approach used 
by Fernandes and Paunov (2014) is close to that used in this paper, the identification of 
cautious versus excessive innovators differs fundamentally.
1.3 D ata
We use micro data derived from merging the third round of Business Environment and 
Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) conducted jointly by the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development and The World Bank in 2008 and the Financial Crisis 
Survey (FCS) organized by The World Bank in 2009 and 2010. BEEPS asked firms 
about a comprehensive set of questions on their business activities, including information 
on innovation and financial variables in the pre-crisis period of 2005-2007. FCS gathered 
information on how the firms performed during the crisis and organized the survey in three 
rounds, of which the first took place in June/July 2009, the second in February/March 
2010 and the third in June/July 2010. Hence this survey covers the main period of the 
economic downturn that began following the crisis of 2008. For more details see The 
World World Bank (2003, Correa et al. (2010).
BEEPS covered a large number of countries in Central, Southern and Eastern Eu­
rope. However, the follow-up FCS was conducted only in six countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Turkey), which limits the country coverage of this study. 
After initial screening of the data, we decided to limit the sample to shareholding compa­
nies because firms with other legal status, i.e., partnerships, limited partnerships and sole 
proprietors, accounted for only about 20% of the observations, and therefore were signifi­
cantly underrepresented. Moreover, we excluded from the sample observations that were 
part of a larger firm - about 10% of the effective sample - because some of the questions 
referred to the whole firm, while others to the establishment only, which disturbed the 
interpretation of the results. Thus, we use a coherent sample of shareholding companies 
with data measured at the firm level; however it is important to note that the estimated 
inferences hold only for these kinds of firms.
Above all, we are interested in the variables that measure the engagement of the firm 
in R&D activity as the major input in the innovation process and the IN N O V  measure of
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innovation output given by the share of sales accounted for by new products and services. 
SU R V IV E  is the crucial dummy variable for the survival of the firm, which has value 
1 if the firm was found to remain active during the crisis.2 Finally, SA LE  stands for 
the estimated year-on-year percentage change of the survivor’s sales that represents their 
performance during the peak time of the crisis.
In addition to a battery of industry and country dummies to control for the respective 
contextual dependencies, the dataset allows us to derive a rich set of firm-specific variables 
that include not only general structural features of the firms such as size, age, location and 
ownership, but also direct evidence on their technological capabilities, market conditions 
and financial situation - conditions that are essential to control for in order to determine 
the impact of the main variables of interest.
EMP accounts for the size, given by the total number of employees, i.e., permanent 
and temporary full-time employees, which is essential to control for scale economies. AGE 
refers to the number of years since the establishment began operations in the country. 
Older firms can capitalize on resources accumulated over time, including learning-by­
doing, while younger firms can ultimately become more agile, flexible and indeed inno­
vative. C IT Y  controls for location in the capital city, and hence for advantages thanks 
to urbanization economies. FO RO W N  refers to the share of foreign ownership, which 
is important to account for as foreign owned firms can benefit from privileged access to 
technology (and finance) from abroad.
An essential part of the picture is the market condition. BEEPS included unique 
questions providing direct evidence on the perceived degree of pressure from customers, 
which allows us to distinguish between their pressure to cut the costs of the existing 
output on one hand, and to develop new products, services and markets on the other. 
From this follow the C O ST P R E SS  and IN N O V P R E S S  variables for the respective 
kind of pressure. Hence, we have proxy variables for the market pull effects on the 
innovativeness of firms and for demand price elasticity of the existing output, which are 
useful for our purpose. Another relevant variable in this domain is the information as to
2 It should be emphasized that the SU R V IV  AL  variable strictly refers to exit in terms of going out 
of business, not through M&A, i.e., the establishment is confirmed to be or not to be active regardless 
of whether it remains standalone or possibly becomes a part of larger entity. For more details on the 
underlying definition see Appendix Table 1.7. The firm is considered active (SURVIVE = 1), if it is 
mentioned in the last wave of the survey. It is considered inactive (SURVIVE  0), if it is mentioned 
as inactive, or filing for bankruptcy in any of three waves. If a firm was active in any of the first two 
waves, but was not surveyed in the third wave, it is not included into our analysis (SURVIVE  is missing). 
Survival status would be considered missing in this case: the way the firm was contacted does not allow 
us to determine whether the firm was active or not.
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whether the firm serves foreign markets, represented by the E X P O R T  intensity.
Structural patterns like these are relevant to control for, but equally important is 
to include variables for the capabilities of firms. RUD has traditionally been the only 
seriously considered indicator. As forcefully argued by Bell and Pavitt (1993), however, 
innovation is about more than just RUD  spending. For this purpose the dataset provides 
information on the adherence to an internationally recognized quality certification, the 
use of the internet in the business and the structure of employment by education. ISO  is 
a dummy for ISO (e.g., 9000, 9002 or 14000) certification, which captures the capability 
to conform to international standards of production and, thus, represents the production 
facet of technological capability in terms of Kim (1997). W E B  is a dummy for using 
the firm’s own website to communicate with clients or suppliers, which captures the 
capability of external interactions mediated by the internet, and hence feeds to the idea of 
Lundvall (1988) that decreasing the information asymmetry between users and producers 
is essential for innovation. Finally, U N IE M P  refers to the share of labor force with a 
university degree, which is a general proxy for the quality of human capital.
A major advantage of BEEPS over data from the CIS is that all of the information, 
including the RUD, ISO  and W E B  variables, is available for the whole sample, whereas 
only firms engaged in innovation activity answer most of the CIS questionnaire. As a 
result, papers based on the latter data actually do not have much information about 
those firms that do not innovate and therefore inferences that can be made about factors 
behind success in the innovation process are limited. If the more detailed information 
from CIS data is used, the estimates suffer from a potential sample selection bias, which 
is difficult to identify precisely due to the lack of information.
Next, M N G E X P  refers to the top manager’s years of experience working in the 
sector, which captures the aspect of her expertise that is the function of time, including 
possible experience with steering a company during crises of various sorts in the past. 
F IN  R E F  is a dummy indicating whether the firm had been denied a loan even before the 
crisis, which identifies firms entering the contest for survival with already weak financial 
records, and thereby signals the likely candidates for trouble. Similarly, the OVERDUE  
variable reveals whether the firm had delayed payments of taxes before the crisis occured, 
and hence whether the firm had been in serious financial distress, on the brink of exiting 
the market, regardless of the downswing. These variables are also highly useful in the 
survival equation.
Finally, sectoral differences are accounted for by a set of IN D U ST R Y  dummies clas-
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sifying firms on the base of their principal activity into fifteen broad categories. Several 
categories in the survey had to be combined for the purpose of the estimation because of 
the low number of observations belonging to the respective industry: basic metals with 
fabricated metal products, retail trade with hotels and restaurants, and information tech­
nology services with the services of motor vehicles. National differences are controlled for 
by a set of C O U N TRY  dummies delineating the location of the firm within borders of 
the respective country. Food and beverages and Turkey are used as the base categories. 
More detailed definitions of the variables are presented in Table 1.8 in the Appendix.
Table 1.1: Descriptive statistics
mean sd m in max N
R&D 0.246 0.431 0 1 1,489
INNOV 13.271 22.935 0 100 1,489
SURVIVE 0.938 0.241 0 1 1,247
SALE -22.488 39.007 -100 300 582
EMP 3.711 1.392 0 9.150 1,489
AGE 2.503 0.688 0 4.727 1,489
CITY 0.682 0.466 0 1 1,489
FOROWN 6.350 22.626 0 100 1,489
COSTPRESS 2.876 0.972 1 4 1,489
INNOVPRESS 2.914 0.968 1 4 1,489
EXPORT 18.171 31.728 0 100 1,489
ISO 0.413 0.493 0 1 1,489
WEB 0.717 0.450 0 1 1,489
UNIEMP 17.026 21.275 0 100 1,489
MNGEXP 2.791 0.679 0 4.317 1,489
FIXREF 0.063 0.243 0 1 1,489
OVERDUE 0.060 0.238 0 1 1,489
Table 1.1 above provides descriptive statistics. After merging the BEEPS and FCS 
surveys and omitting observations with missing data, the dataset provides information 
on a sample of (1) 1,489; (2) 1,247 and (3) 582 shareholding companies, depending on the 
equation to be estimated. Sample (1) is the richest, which we use to estimate innovation 
production function described in the next section. Further, the data on firms’ survival is 
limited, which leads us to a reduced sample (2). Finally, as an extension of the analysis 
we would use the data on sales, which has a substantial number of missing observations. 
This leads us to sample (3).
About 25% of the firms engaged in R&D, and on average about 13% of their sales 
resulted from new products or services. Subsequently during the economic crisis, roughly 
6% of the firms exited the market. Not surprisingly, the survivors recorded a drop in 
sales on average of about 22% during the crisis. Statistics of the other variables are
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self-explanatory and will be examined in more detail later in relation to the dependent 
variables in the econometric framework.
It is fruitful to compare the survivors and those exiting the market during the crisis, 
which gives us an initial indication of the factors driving the difference. Table 1.2 presents 
the two-way comparisons and results of (paired) t-test on the equality of the group means, 
indicating whether the difference is statistically significant. A brief glance at the pairs 
with highly significant differences confirms the intuition that the firms who survived 
tend to be older, have a better educated workforce, appear to be more export intensive, 
adhere to internationally recognized standards, use the internet to communicate along 
the value chain, and have lower probability of having to struggle with rejected loans and 
overdue taxes. Furthermore, the comparison indicates that on one hand the survivors 
have a higher probability of engaging in R&D, but on the other they have a lower level 
of innovative sales both within the whole sample and particularly in the sub-sample of 
innovating firms.
Nevertheless, in this preliminary ’unconditional’ comparison these differences are not 
statistically significant at the conventional thresholds, albeit the latter is close to being 
at least weakly significant at the 10% level. This points to an intriguing contrast in the 
impact of innovation that requires closer scrutiny.
Table 1.2: Two-way comparison of group means
SURVIVE
Difference St.dev. NYes No
R&D 0.238 0.182 0.057 (0.050) 1,247
INNOV 13.074 13.584 -0.511 (2.662) 1,247
INNOV INNOV > 0 27.025 34.867 -7.842 (4.873) 596
EMP 3.736 3.581 0.155 (0.163) 1,247
AGE 2.536 2.334 0.202 (0.077)*** 1,247
CITY 0.637 0.649 -0.013 (0.057) 1,247
FOROWN 6.982 5.792 1.190 (2.775) 1,247
COSTPRESS 2.887 2.857 0.030 (0.115) 1,247
INNOVPRESS 2.922 2.844 0.078 (0.114) 1,247
EXPORT 18.044 8.429 9.616 (3.643)*** 1,247
ISO 0.434 0.260 0.174 (0.058)*** 1,247
WEB 0.733 0.532 0.201 (0.053)*** 1,247
UNIEMP 17.803 9.714 8.088 (2.530)*** 1,247
MNGEXP 2.803 2.688 0.114 (0.078) 1,247
FINREF 0.055 0.130 -0.075 (0.028)*** 1,247
OVERDUE 0.034 0.195 -0.161 (0.024)*** 1,247
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
An important issue that needs to be acknowledged is the overall representativeness 
of the dataset, which could be seen as relatively low by some observers, in particular by
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those who have the fortune to work with extensive CIS micro datasets. Nevertheless, 
we should not necessarily judge the data by these standards because the BEEPS and 
FCS datasets bring extremely rare but much needed micro evidence on the connection 
between the innovation and performance of firms during the crisis that, to the best of our 
knowledge, has not been presented in the literature so far, at least not in the context of 
less advanced countries. Another issue is the somewhat disproportional composition of 
the sample by country: Bulgaria (10%), Hungary (12%), Latvia (10%), Lithuania (10%), 
Romania (17%) and Turkey (41%), with shares in the largest version of the sample in 
brackets. Turkey and Romania are by far the largest countries, and hence their shares 
are reasonable. However, Latvia and Lithuania are probably over-represented, although 
specifically in terms of the number of shareholding companies in the economy this might 
not necessarily be the case.
1.4 Model
Building on the CDM framework pioneered by Crepon, Duguet, and Mairesse (1998) and 
further developed in a variety of models, e.g. by Loof and Heshmati (2002), Griffith et al. 
(2006), Parisi, Schiantarelli, and Sembenelli (2006), Roper, Du, and Love (2008) and 
OECD (2009), we use the innovation production function to derive the predicted level of 
innovation output and then use this information to explain the subsequent performance 
of firms. Nevertheless, we depart from the CDM template in three major ways. First, we 
integrate the survival equation into the model, which is particularly relevant in studying 
how firms coped with the crisis, and which, to the best of our knowledge, has not been 
used in this framework so far.
Second, because we use data derived from BEEPS, and not from CIS as do most 
papers on this topic, we adjust the model specification to the available data. Finally, and 
perhaps most importantly, we test for the possibility that excessive innovation harms 
firms during a recession. Let i index firms and t denote time. All of the equations include 
X it - a set of control variables:
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X it G (EM Pit, AGEit, FOROWNit, C ITYit, C O ST P R E SSit, IN N O V P R E S S it, 
EXPORTu, ISO it, W E B it, U N IE M P it, M N G E X P it, F IN R E F it, OVERDU Eit, 
IN D U STRY^, COUNTRYit).
These control variables consist of covariates that account for structural characteristics, 
capabilities and resources of firms, market conditions, technological differences across 
industries and spatial differences, which are deemed to be relevant across the board, and 
therefore allowed to affect the survival odds and performance of firms both directly and 
indirectly through innovation.
To obtain the predicted innovation output, we estimate the innovation production 
function by means of zero-inflated negative binomial model (ZINB) for count data with 
robust standard errors [Greene (2007, pp.922-924); Hilbe (2011, pp.370-386)]. A count 
data model serves our purpose as the INNOVu  variable is coded in discrete shares from 
0% to 100%, and thus can be represented by counts [0, 100]. ZINB is suitable if the 
outcome variable contains excessive zeroes and at the same time when the outcome is 
overdispersed; both of which fit with our data rather well.3 Hence, given these data 
properties, the model assumes two different data generating processes for excessive zero 
and positive count outcomes.
In our case, more specifically, this means that zero shares of innovative sales can be 
observed if:
1. a firm did not innovate, the firm did not introduce new products or services
2. a firm has innovated, but these innovation activities have not resulted in sales of 
new products and services.
Hence, the empirical representation of the innovation production function, as modelled 
by these two data generating processes, is as follows:
0 if INNOVu < 0
(1.1)
1,2,3,..., 100 ÍIN N O V „ > 0
where IN N O V it refers to the predicted share of innovation sales and IN N O V it is the 
actual observed share of innovation sales.
3First, we ran a score test, which rejected the hypothesis of no Poisson overdispersion and then 
we consulted the boundary likelihood ratio test, which showed that the negative binominal model is 
preferable over Poisson in addressing the overdispersion (Hilbe 2011).
IN N O V it =
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Cameron and Trivedi (2005) point out that in practice covariates of the two data 
generating processes for this model are the same, although they do not need to be. 
Therefore, as covariates we include the whole set, including the R&D dummy, of firm- 
specific variables at our disposal. Unfortunately, the likely lag between investment in 
R&D, the other controls X it, and the output of the innovation process have to be ignored 
because of data limitations.
For more technical details on the ZIXB estimator, see Stata (2013, p.6).4 5
As a robustness check we treat IN N O Vlt as a continuous variable and estimate a 
two-part model, which combines Logit with Generalized Linear Model (see Table 1.9). 
The main results of all subsequent analyses hold both quantitavely and qualitatively.
Subsequently, we calculate a difference (D IFFit) between the actual share of inno­
vation sales (INNOVit) and the share predicted by the innovation production function 
(INNOVit) and use this insight to determine what we henceforth call excessively and 
cautiously innovating firms. The kernel densities of IN N O V it and IN N O V it are de­
picted in Figure 1.1 in the Appendix. If the difference falls into the top decile, i.e., the 
top tenth of the D IFFit distribution, the firm is considered to be on excessive innovator 
(INNO Vexcessit).
Conversely, if the difference falls into the bottom decile, i.e., the bottom tenth of the 
DIFFit distribution, the firm is labeled as a cautious innovator (I  N  NOVcautiousit). In 
other words, these are dummy variables with value 1 if the firm falls into the respective 
part of the D IF F it distribution and zero otherwise. The kernel density of D IFFit withthe 
top ten and bottom ten deciles is depicted in Figure 1.2 in the Appendix. The idea is 
to identify which of the firms exhibit higher versus lower innovation intensity than what 
can be reasonably expected given the underlying conditions in which the firm operates; 
which of the firms stretch their resources too far with regard to innovation, thus displaying 
particularly risky behaviour and vice-a-versa.0
In the equation of prime interest, we estimate the probability of a firm’s survival as
4We further performed formal tests to compare ZINB model against the main alternatives, namely 
zero-inflated Poisson and standard negative binomial models. A ZIP likelihood-ratio test that compares 
the ZINB model and zero-inflated Poisson model conies out with statistically significant alpha, which 
indicates that some heterogeneity is a source of overdispersion in the innovation output, thus ZINB is 
more appropriate. Statistically significant Vuong test confirms that ZINB model is preferable over a 
standard negative binomial model, which also allows for overdispersion (Vuong 1989).
5Kernel densities of IN N O V a  and IN N O V it distributions are presented Figure 1.1 in the Appendix. 
Kernel density of the resulting distribution of D IFFa  as well as the top/bottom deciles are presented 
Figure 1.2 in the Appendix. Sensitivity tests of the results to the cut-off point are presented in the next 
section.
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the function of the actual past innovation output and the dummies for excessive and 
cautious innovation. The aim is to determine whether innovation strategies made firms 
more likely to overcome the economic downturn. Hence, there is a latent survival variable 
which refers to some threshold for survival executed by stakeholders but 
unobserved in the data, such as the expected net gains from continuing the business by
the owners or the probability of default perceived by the creditors:
SU R V IV E it+i = 0 if SU RVTVEit+i = A, + faIN N O V it+
+/?2̂  N  N O V excess.it + fo l  N  N  OV cautiousit-\-
+ P i X it  +  U2it < 01 __  (1-2)
SU R V IV E im  =  1 if S U R V I V E ^  = ft, + /31IN N 0V „+
+/32IN  NOVexcessit +
E^X-it + u2it > 0
where u2it is the standard normally distributed error term and the covariates are 
lagged. Since the dependent variable is binary, probit (or logit) estimator seems suitable 
for estimating the latent survival variable equation. Nevertheless, Johnston and Dinardo 
(1996) emphasize that any misspecification of the likelihood in probit (or logit) will lead 
to inconsistent estimates. Unfortunately, this can be the case here, because among the co­
variates are included the lagged IN  N  OV excess^ and INNOVcautiousu  that have been 
estimated using a similar set of variables in the previous step. As a result, distributional 
assumptions in the error term of probit (or logit) are likely to be violated.
Another possibility is to use a linear probability model. Ordinary least square (OLS) 
estimates, for instance, are known to be more robust to specification errors and, as Rawl­
ings, Pantula, and Dickey (1998) point out, the assumption that residuals are normally 
distributed is not necessary for the estimation of regression parameters, but only for 
significance tests and the construction of confidence intervals, though the latter weak­
ness can be overcome by re-sampling methods. Furthermore, according to Cameron and 
Trivedi (2005), OLS provides reasonable direct estimates for sample-average marginal 
effects on probabilities that approach 1 due to changes in explanatory variables. They 
also suggest that maximum likelihood estimation can be more efficient than OLS, but 
numerically unstable, as high weights are placed on observations with probability close to
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0 or 1, and the efficiency gains are often small. Hence, we estimate the survival equation 
with OLS. Limitations of OLS estimates are well studied (see, e.g. Greene 2007).
Estimated probabilities are not bounded to [0, 1] interval. Horrace and Oaxaca (2006) 
suggest that a high share of estimates, the predicted probabilities of which lie outside 
a unit interval, lead to bias and inconsistency. Wooldridge (2010) points out that if 
the main purpose is the estimation of partial effects on response probability, averaged 
across the distribution of the independent variable, the fact that some predicted proba­
bilities are outside the unit interval is not very important. OLS estimation also leads to 
heteroskedastic standard errors, but this can be tackled by estimating robust standard 
errors.
Both of these concerns are addressed in this paper. First, we estimate the survival 
equation with OLS adjusted for heteroscedasticity with robust (Eicker-Huber-White) 
standard errors (we also report Logit estimates for comparison) and then make an ad­
ditional robustness check by estimating bootstrapped standard errors. Second, following 
Horrace and Oaxaca’s (2006) suggestion, we perform a robustness check by excluding 
observations with predicted probabilities outside the unit interval from our dataset and 
estimate the model based on the trimmed sample. This procedure may reduce the OLS 
bias.
Finally, we estimate the impact of past innovativeness on the growth of sales of the 
survivors (SALEit+i) by OLS:
SALEit+1 = S0 + SJN N O Vu + S2INNOVaccessit
(1-3)
+ 53IN  N O V cautious^ + S^Xit + u3it
where u3a is the standard normally distributed error term, the covariates are lagged 
and SALEit+3, is observed only when SURVIVEn+x is equal to one. Admittedly, the 
latter restriction for observing the sales growth entails a potential selection bias. Never­
theless, there is a lack of instrumental variables that could properly identify the selection; 
therefore, we restrict the sample to the survivors only, noting that this limitation is well 
acknowledged.
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1.5 R esu lts
Table 1.4 reports the main results. Column 1 presents the ZIXB estimate of the innovation 
production equation. Marginal effects at the mean of the covariates are reported6. As 
a robustness check, Table 1.9 in the Appendix presents the main results for the TPM 
estimate of the innovation production function.
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 1.4 give results of the OLS estimate of the survival equation, 
where the first specification takes into account only the actual innovation output and 
the second estimate also includes the dummies for excessive and cautious innovation. 
In Table 1.10 in the Appendix we also present results for an alternative (Logit model) 
for comparison. The main results are similar both quantitavely and qualitatively, but 
marginally less statistically significant.
Table 1.3: Observations with different predicted probability of survival after OLS
Interval <0 [0;i] >1
Obs. 0 1233 256 1,489
Share 0% 82.8% 17.2% 100%
As a sizable share of predicted probabilities is above 1, we estimate the equation 
again using a trimmed sample. Columns 4 and 5 present robustness tests of the OLS 
estimator with regard to bootstrapping standard errors and using the trimmed sample. 
Hereafter, the subscripts i and t are not indicated for the simplicity of presentation. 
IN D U ST R Y  and C O U N TRY  dummies are accounted for across the board, but the 
estimated coefficients not presented in order to save space.
First, we check whether the results of the first equation for IN N O V  are in line 
with the existing literature. The main outcome is that the impact of RUD  is positive 
and highly statistically significant, thus not surprisingly confirming the assumed input- 
output relationship (OECD 2009). Moreover, the proportion of innovative sales decreases 
with the firm size, which is also reassuring as previous evidence such as Brouwer and 
Kleinknecht (1996) and a long line of subsequent studies have shown that the propensity 
to innovate increases less than proportionately with size. FO RO W N  is positive, because 
foreign affiliates benefit from technology transfer from their parent group.
6We also estimate this equation using the reduced sample (1,247 obs.). Qualitatively and quantita­
tively the results are similar to those reported in Table 1.4, but marginally less statistically significant.
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Table 1.4: Results of the innovation output and survival equations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ZINB INNOV OLS SURVIVE OLS SURVIVE OLS SURVIVE OLS SURVIVE
robust robust robust bootstr. bootstr. trim.
EMP -0.8409 (0.5039)* -0.0042 (0.0054) -0.0042 (0.0054) -0.0042 (0.0053) -0.0052 (0.0064)
AGE -1.4605 (0.9115) 0.0247 (0.0150)* 0.0269 (0.0151)* 0.0269 (0.0155)* 0.0419 (0.0168)**
CITY 0.1040 (3.9140) -0.0087 (0.0219) -0.0081 (0.0219) -0.0081 (0.0219) -0.0018 (0.0339)
FOROWN 0.0522 (0.0280)* -0.0002 (0.0003) -0.0003 (0.0003) -0.0003 (0.0003) -0.0005 (0.0003)
COSTPRESS -0.1852 (0.7520) -0.0010 (0.0099) -0.0008 (0.0099) -0.0008 (0.0096) 0.0015 (0.0127)
INNPRESS 1.1534 (0.7903) 0.0060 (0.0098) 0.0048 (0.0098) 0.0048 (0.0097) 0.0040 (0.0123)
EXPORT -0.0047 (0.0219) 0.0007 (0.0002)*** 0.0008 (0.0002)*** 0.0008 (0.0002)*** 0.0011 (0.0004)***
ISO 0.5150 (1.2817) 0.0197 (0.0147) 0.0180 (0.0148) 0.0180 (0.0147) 0.0287 (0.0172)*
WEB 5.9340 (1.4363)*** 0.0449 (0.0188)** 0.0349 (0.0189)* 0.0349 (0.0188)* 0.0394 (0.0198)**
UNIE MP -0.0107 (0.0274) 0.0007 (0.0002)*** 0.0007 (0.0002)*** 0.0007 (0.0002)*** 0.0012 (0.0003)***
MNGEXP 0.8211 (0.8845) 0.0012 (0.0132) -0.0003 (0.0132) -0.0003 (0.0134) -0.0011 (0.0145)
FINREF 0.1151 (2.2584) -0.0492 (0.0368) -0.0478 (0.0363) -0.0478 (0.0362) -0.0616 (0.0382)
OVERDUE -0.6847 (2.3223) -0.1996 (0.0587)*** -0.1994 (0.0584)*** -0.1994 (0.0577)*** -0.2116 (0.0579)***
R&D 8.5514 (1.2000)***
INNOVexcess -0.0959 (0.0484)** -0.0959 (0.0482)** -0.1423 (0.0583)**
INNOV -0.0001 (0.0003) 0.0011 (0.0006)* 0.0011 (0.0006)* 0.0017 (0.0009)**
INNOVcautious 0.0477 (0.0192)** 0.0477 (0.0187)** 0.0743 (0.0279)***
Intercept 0.8222 (0.0574)*** 0.8116 (0.0576)*** 0.8116 (0.0574)*** 0.8093 (0.9175)
INDUSTRY Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
COUNTRY Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F 2.05*** 2.02***
Wald x 2 (35) 91.56*** 68.24*** 66.44***
J?2 0.0865 0.0919 0.0919 0.0988
N 1,489 1,247 1,247 1,247 1,026
Marginal effects at mean are reported for ZINB. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p <  0.05, *** p < 0.01
W E B  comes out with a highly significantly positive coefficient, which highlights the 
importance of user-producer interactions mediated by the internet. Other coefficients are 
not statistically significant at the conventional levels.
However, the prime interest is in the survival equation with the SURVIVE dummy 
as the dependent variable. The first estimate, presented in column 2 of Table 1.4 in the 
Appendix, allows only for the straightforward impact of innovation output and control 
variables.
Results of the latter are in line with expectations. AGE, E X P O R T , W E B  and 
U N IE M P , i.e. the firm’s age, educated workforce, website, and export intensity, are esti­
mated to significantly boost the survival odds, while the financial distress ’pre-determined’ 
condition given by OVERDU E  has rather negative consequences.
Surprisingly, however, the estimated coefficient of IN N O V  does not come out to be 
significantly different from zero. Thus, according to this specification, innovation does 
not make a significant difference.
However, the impact of innovation is more complex. In the second specification, pre­
sented in column 3 of Table 1.4 in the Appendix, we disentangle the impact of innovation 
by adding the dummy variables that identify the excessively versus cautiously innovat­
ing firms. The survival probability is estimated to significantly increase with the lagged 
innovation output, though only conditional on not being classified in the two extreme 
categories. All else equal, a 10 percentage point increase in the share of sales accounted 
for by products or services introduced over three years before the crisis occurred is associ­
ated with an estimated 1.1 percentage point increase in the odds of survival thereafter. It 
needs to be pointed out, however, that the coefficient continues to be estimated relatively 
imprecisely.
Most interestingly, there is a stark contrast in the estimated survival odds between 
the excessively and cautiously innovating firms. Indeed, the excessive innovators turn 
out far less likely to survive; they are severely punished for following the exceedingly 
bullish strategy. If firms excessively innovated before the crisis started, their survival 
probability is estimated to drop by about 9.6 percentage points during the downturn. In 
other words, firms that found themselves too dependent on new output at the outbreak 
of the crisis ended up in trouble. Conversely, the cautious innovators are estimated to 
be by 4.8 percentage points less likely to die. Firms benefited from pursuing a rather 
low-profile innovation strategy. Both of the coefficients are statistically significant at the 
5% level.
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If we use bootstrapping (with 2,500 replications) to estimate standard errors nonpara- 
metrically, see column 4 of Table 1.4 in the Appendix, the standard errors come out very 
similar and the estimated coefficients remain significant at the same levels. Hence, the 
violation of distributional assumptions is not a serious problem. The initial OLS model 
with robust standard errors is reasonable. Furthermore, following Horrace and Oaxaca’s 
(2006) suggestion, we estimate the survival equation using the trimmed sample to reduce 
finite sample bias. The results are presented in the last column of Table 1.4 in the Ap­
pendix. The trimmed estimate reconfirms the main conclusions, although the magnitude 
of the coefficients increases noticeably, so the true effects in fact might be even stronger.
Finally, Table 1.5 presents variations in the threshold of INNOVexcess and INNOV- 
cautious as robustness checks. First, we use the same definition derived from quantiles of 
D IF F  distribution but extend the threshold below and above the baseline cutoff point. 
Second, we switch to using symmetric thresholds based on standard deviations from the 
mean of D IFF. Third, we use absolute thresholds asymmetric to the D IF F  distribu­
tion, in which the cut-off point is given by the value of D IF F  in percentage points. OLS 
with robust standard errors estimated on the full sample is used for this purpose. To save 
space, only the results of the innovation covariates are reported here.
Table 1.5: Robustness of the results to the threshold
INNO Vexcess INNOV INNOVcautious
Coef. St.dev. Coef. St.dev. Coef. St.dev.
5% and 95% 0.0105 (0.0543) -0.0001 (0.0006) 0.0365 (0.0264)
10% and 90% -0.0959 (0.0484)** 0.0011 (0.0006)* 0.0477 (0.0192)**
15% and 85% -0.0241 (0.0345) 0.0003 (0.0006) 0.0250 (0.0214)
+ /-  0.75 sd -0.0355 (0.0387) 0.0005 (0.0006) 0.0498 (0.0189)***
+ /-  1.00 sd -0.0799 (0.0456)** 0.0009 (0.0006) 0.0657 (0.0195)***
+ /-  1.25 sd -0.0529 (0.0488) 0.0005 (0.0006) 0.0791 (0.0278)***
+ /-  15 ppt -0.0338 (0.0364) 0.0005 (0.0006) 0.0245 (0.0213)
+ /-  25 ppt -0.0895 (0.0479)* 0.0010 (0.0006) 0.0753 (0.0236)***
+ /-  35 ppt -0.0377 (0.0503) 0.0003 (0.0006) 0.0728 (0.0338)**
Robust standard errors in parentheses. % - distribution quantiles; 
sd - standard deviations from the mean of D IFF; 
ppt - absolute value of DIFF in percentage points 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The results confirm that innovativeness boosts the survival prospects of firms, but 
only up to a certain point, beyond which the positive effect starts to diminish and even­
tually reverses into negative. Regardless of the threshold definition, there is always a top 
and bottom cut-off point that is statistically significant at the conventional levels. If the 
difference between actual and predicted innovation output is excessive, the survival prob-
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ability is estimated to decrease as much as about 8 to 10 percentage points. Conversely, 
if the innovator is cautious, the likelihood of survival increases by about 5 to 8 percentage 
points.
Finally, Table 1.6 provides results of the final equation on the sales growth of the 
survivors. Column 1 gives results of the conventional OLS estimator. Column 2 presents 
the OLS results excluding major outliers based on Cook’s distance. Column 3 shows 
coefficients derived from OLS robust to outliers following the procedure by Li (2011). 
About 20% to 30% of the variability in sales growth is explained. The pivotal finding is 
that if the influence of outliers is treated, the impact of innovativeness is qualitatively 
similar to the previous equation, i.e. that excessive innovation backfires with a signifi­
cantly negative impact, while modest innovation seems to be rewarded. During a rapid 
slump in demand, excessive innovation not only threatens the very foundations of firms, 
but also leads to a disproportionate loss of the market if the firm happens to withstand 
the turmoil.
Table 1.6: Results of the sales growth equations
(1) (2) (3)
OLS OLS excl. O LS robust
EM P 4.80 (1.27)*** 4.39 (0.94)*** 5.01 (1.10)**
AGE 2.25 (2.72) 1.87 (1.96) 1.82 (2-14)
CITY 0.85 (5.90) -2 .7 0 (5.36) -1 .1 0 (8.39)
FOROW N 0.09 (0.08) 0.12 (0.04)*** 0.10 (0.06)*
CO STPRESS 0.57 (2-45) 1.45 (1.80) 2.34 (1.99)
INNOVPRESS -1 .8 6 (2.40) -1 .2 0 (1-77) -1 .3 2 (2.00)
EX PO R T 0.04 (0.08) 0.01 (0.05) -0 .0 5 (0.05)
ISO -1 .8 5 (3.95) -0 .7 4 (2.85) 0.64 (3.03)
W EB 4.12 (3.62) 2.72 (2.95) 2.79 (3.30)
UNIEM P 0.09 (0.07) 0.06 (0.05) 0.04 (0.06)
M NGEXP 0.70 (2.25) 0.35 (1.80) -0 .1 8 (1.99)
FIX R EF -1 .4 9 (6.31) -2 .7 7 (4.44) -1 .0 8 (5.68)
OVERDUE -1 1 .58 (8.99) -9 .5 5 (5.79)* -10 .69 (7-19)
INNOVexcess -1 5 .5 4 (11.24) -1 4 .6 4 (6.88)** -16 .93 (8.15)**
INNOV 0.20 (0.13) 0.20 (0.10)** 0.23 (0.11)**
INNOVcautious 3.88 (7-15) 0.04 (4.91) 0.74 (4-75)
Constant -5 2 .2 4 (14.89)*** -57 .93 (9.06)*** -59 .93 (9.68)**
INDUSTRY Yes Yes Yes
COUNTRY Yes Yes Yes
F 5.45*** 7.24*** 5.18***




N 582 548 582
Robust s tandard  errors in parentheses 
* p  < 0.10, ** p <  0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Overall, the central hypothesis of this paper that during a major crisis the positive 
innovation-survival connection breaks down if the firm becomes excessively exposed is 
strongly supported by the data. Firms that pursued a low-profile innovation strategy 
before the crisis occurred found themselves in a much better position to absorb the hit. 
However, if the firm stretched its resources with regard to innovation too far, if the firm 
bitted more before the crisis than it can chew during the downturn, the consequences were 
detrimental to the firm. In this respect the results broadly concord with the findings of 
Fernandes and Paunov (2014) that cautious innovators are better off than others.
1.6 Conclusion
Schumpeter (2013, p.84) argued long ago that competing through innovation "strikes not 
at the margins of the profits and the outputs of the existing firms but at their foundations 
and their very lives". However, during turbulent times like these, the innovation-survival 
connection may become somehow more complicated than usual. Using a unique mi­
cro dataset that provides information on the pre-crisis innovativeness of firms and their 
survival as well as performance during the crisis gave us a rare opportunity to econo- 
metrically test this proposition. The results confirmed that innovation generally boosts 
survival odds during severe crises but with a major clarification.
Innovation can turn toxic if overdone just before the crisis occurs if the firm becomes 
too exposed. Firms identified as excessive innovators before the crisis -  those that ceteris 
paribus innovated significantly more than can be reasonably expected given what we 
know about them -  turned out to be far more likely to die thereafter. If firms excessively 
innovated, their survival probability is estimated to drop by about 8 to 10 percentage 
points during the peak period of the downturn. In addition, the surviving excessive 
innovators experienced a significantly deeper reduction in sales. Firms that were too 
bold at the outbreak of the crisis faced serious consequences.
Arguably, the results challenge the widespread consensus that is strongly proliferated 
in the literature that more innovation is always better, that if anything innovation has a 
positive impact on the performance and ultimate survival of firms. In fact, at a theoretical 
level, this consensus is strikingly out of sync with evolutionary thinking, as what matters 
for survival is to be the fittest, and the selection environment is anything but static. 
Over the long term the selection surely favors the innovative, but there are periods - 
cataclysmic events - such as deep, prolonged recessions, when the selection criteria is
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profoundly different. Thus the sentiment that innovation is a panacea that always needs 
to be promoted to its maximum no matter what must be critically questioned.
Nevertheless, no crisis lasts forever. If an appetite for risky innovation is sociably 
desirable and the crisis selects out viable business - and thus innovators that would thrive 
otherwise, including those that may drive the recovery - there is a role for public policy 
to mitigate the possibly short-lived selection bias. To the extent that efforts devoted 
to innovation bring large economic benefits over the long term and the most bullish 
innovators are destroyed by recessions, there could be a failure in dynamic terms that 
needs to be corrected by policy interventions. These could include, e.g. support of jobs 
for highly-skilled (or R&D) workers, loan guaranties for bold innovation projects, public 
procurement for innovation to alleviate demand drop, etc.
Finally, managers should be aware that excessive innovation can undermine the sur­
vival prospects of their firm in times of economic crisis. An innovation project that is 
financially viable of the assumption on growing demand can easily sink the company if 
a crisis arrives unexpectedly. The results clearly confirm that maintaining a balanced 
portfolio of innovative and other sources of revenue is as important for a firm’s survival 
as the capability to generate new products and services. Although not always possible, 
it is advisable to conduct a diligent risk-assessment of a firm’s innovation strategies.
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Complete effective interview 838 819 768
Incomplete effective interview 3 3 33
Firm exists but not interviewed 60 4 70
SURVIVE = 0
The firm is inactive 26 12 25
The firm discontinued business 4 5 8
The firm discontinued business
and filed for bankruptcy I 4 10
The firm discontinues business
and is filing for bankruptcy 0 o y
SURVIVE = missing (not considered)
ID not in response reports 86 0 0
Refusal 143 252 260
Answering machine 0 3 0
Fax line - data line 7 2 0
Wrong contact details 1 0 0
No reply after several calls 50 80 6
Line out of order 3 8 1
No tone 2 5 0
Not available at time of interviewing 0 4 6
Wrong number 1 27 11
Busy 1 1 0
Appointment 6 8 44
Total number of observations 1,244 1,245 1,247
N = 1,247 obs.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the EBRD and World Bank FCS survey
Table 1.8: Definition of the variables
Variables Description
R&D Dummy variable with value 1 if the firm spent on research and development
activities either in-house or contracted with other companies in 2007
INNOV % of sales in 2007 accounted for by products or services introduced over 2005
2007
SURVIVE Dummy variable with value 1 if the firm conducted effective interview or was 
found to continue business and could be reached by the surveyors (but was not 
interviewed as sample target was already achieved) in the FCS in mid-2010
and with value 0 if the firm has been found to become inactive, discontinued
business or reported in the FCS to file for bankruptcy/insolvency from mid-
2008 to mid-2010
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Table 1.8: Definition of the variables (continued)
Variables Description
SALE % change of firm’s sales between the last completed month in 2010 (third wave. 
June-July) and the same month in 2009 (first wave. June-July)
EMP Logarithm of the number of full-time employees at the end of 2007
AGE Logarithm of the number of years until 2008 since the firm began operations
CITY
in the country
Dummy variable with value 1 if the firm was located in the capital city in 2007
FOROWN % of the firm owned by private foreign individuals, companies or organizations
in 2007
COSTPRESS Likert scale variable indicating by integers from zero to four whether the pres-
INNOVPRESS
sure from customers in affecting decisions with respect to reducing the produc­
tion costs of existing products or services was 1 not at all important 2 slightly
important 3 fairly important 4 very important in 2007
Likert scale variable indicating by integers from zero to four whether the pres-
EXPORT
sure from customers in affecting decisions to develop new products or services
and markets was 1 not at all important 2 slightly important 3 fairly important
4 very important in 2007
% of sales exported directly or indirectly (sold domestically to third party that
ISO
exports) in 2007
Dummy variable with value 1 if the firm had an internationally recognised
quality certification, for example ISO 9000. 9002 or 14000. in 2007
WEB Dummy variable with value 1 if the firm used its own website to communicate
UNIEMP
with clients or suppliers in 2007
% of labour force with a university degree at the end of 2007
MNGEXP Logarithm of top manager’s years of experience working in this sector until
2008
FIXREF Dummy variable with value 1 if the firm applied for new loans or new lines of
OVERDUE
credit that were rejected in 2007
Dummy variable with value 1 if the firm had delayed payments of taxes for
more than 90 days in 2007
INDUSTRY Dummy variables with value 1 if the principal activity of the firm is classified
in a food and beverages b textiles c garments d chemicals e plastics and rubber
f  non-metallic mineral products g basic metals and fabricated metal products
h machinery and equipment i electronics j  other manufacturing k construction
I retail, hotel and restaurants n transport rn wholesale o other services
COUNTRY Dummy variables with value 1 if the firm is located in Bulgaria. Hungary.
Latvia. Lithuania. Romania and Turkey
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Table 1.9: Results of the innovation output and survival equations after Two-Part Model
toCn
(1)














EMP -0.8358 (0.4967)* -0.0042 (0.0054) -0.0044 (0.0054) -0.0044 (0.0054) -0.0058 (0.0066)
AGE -1.4838 (0.9989) 0.0247 (0.0150)* 0.0269 (0.0151)* 0.0269 (0.0155)* 0.0418 (0.0174)
CITY 0.3913 (2.9487) -0.0087 (0.0219) -0.0090 (0.0220) -0.0090 (0.0225) -0.0033 (0.0341)
FOROWN 0.0489 (0.0278)* -0.0002 (0.0003) -0.0003 (0.0003) -0.0003 (0.0003) -0.0005 (0.0003)
COSTPRESS -0.2224 (0.7719) -0.0010 (0.0099) -0.0010 (0.0099) -0.0010 (0.0098) 0.0011 (0.0123)
INNPRESS 1.4570* (0.7750) 0.0060 (0.0098) 0.0045 (0.0099) 0.0045 (0.0098) 0.0036 (0.0123)
EXPORT -0.0061 (0.0231) 0.0007 (0.0002)*** 0.0008 (0.0002)*** 0.0008 (0.0002)*** 0.0011 (0.0004)
ISO 0.8099 (1.3308) 0.0197 (0.0147) 0.0176 (0.0148) 0.0176 (0.0150) 0.0277 (0.0179)
WEB 5.4379 (1.4060)*** 0.0449 (0.0188)** 0.0354 (0.0185)* 0.0354 (0.0185)* 0.0403 (0.0201)
UNIE MP 0.0007 (0.0274) 0.0007 (0.0002)*** 0.0007 (0.0002)*** 0.0007 (0.0002)*** 0.0012 (0.0004)
MNGEXP 0.5922 (0.8817) 0.0012 (0.0132) -0.0003 (0.0132) -0.0003 (0.0136) -0.0004 (0.0143)
FINREF 0..2423 (2.3872) -0.0492 (0.0368) -0.0481 (0.0365) -0.0481 (0.0370) -0.0619 (0.0369)
OVERDUE -0.7634 (2.4715) -0.1996 (0.0587)*** -0.2001 (0.0581)*** -0.2001 (0.0587)*** -0.2124 (0.0573)
R&D 8.7764 (1.2498)***
INNOVexcess -0.0988 (0.0484)** -0.0988 (0.0495)** -0.1449 (0.0569)
INNOV -0.0001 (0.0003) 0.0012 (0.0006)* 0.0012 (0.0006)* 0.0017 (0.0008)
INNOVcautious 0.0484 (0.0202)** 0.0484 (0.0205)** 0.0752 (0.0292)
Intercept 0.8222 (0.0574)*** 0.8109 (0.0575)*** 0.8109 (0.0573)*** 0.7566 (0.0679)
INDUSTRY Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
COUNTRY Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F 2.05*** 2.04***
Wald x2 (35) 70.48*** 64.65***
Pseudo 7? 2 0.1143
J?2 0.0865 0.0922 0.0922 0.0992
N 1,489 1,247 1,247 1,247 1,026
Marginal effects at mean are reported for TPM. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01







EMP -0.0815 (0.0989) -0.0707 (0.1008) -0.0707 (0.1086)
AGE 0.4085 (0.2211)* 0.4246 (0.2187)* 0.4246 (0.2274)
CITY 0.2884 (1.0795) 0.3082 (1.1036) 0.3082 (6.3930)
FOROWN -0.0052 (0.0056) -0.0065 (0.0061) -0.0065 (0.0068)
COSTPRESS 0.0091 (0.1992) 0.0252 (0.2039) 0.0252 (0.2128)
INNPRESS 0.0653 (0.1822) 0.0377 (0.1891) 0.0377 (0.1992)
EXPORT 0.0161 (0.0064)** 0.0165 (0.0065)** 0.0165 (0.0077)
ISO 0.5301 (0.3172)* 0.4627 (0.3205) 0.4627 (0.3318)
WEB 0.6882 (0.2797)** 0.5002 (0.2865)* 0.5002 (0.3155)
UNIEMP 0.0257 (0.0092)*** 0.0252 (0.0094)*** 0.0252 (0.0104)
MNGEXP 0.0176 (0.2125) -0.0104 (0.2116) -0.0104 (0.2294)
FIXREF -0.6292 (0.4052) -0.6659 (0.3932)* -0.6659 (0.4225)
OVERDUE -1.7728 (0.3802)*** --1.7785 (0.3743)*** -1.7785 (0.4453)
INNOVexcess -1.5404 (0.7839)** -1.5404 (0.8200)
INNOV -0.0008 (0.0059) 0.0203 (0.0120)* 0.0203 (0.0129)
INNOVcautious 1.4606 (0.8391)* 1.4606 (0.7435)
Intercept 1.0400 (0.9129) 0.8093 (0.9176) 0.8093 (0.9982)
INDUSTRY Yes Yes Yes
COUNTRY Yes Yes Yes
Wald y 2 y2 (33) = 108.67*** y2 (35) = 113.22*** X2 (35) = 78.22***
Pseudo 7?2 0.1660 0.1790 0.1790
N 1,247 1,247 1,247
Raw log-odds are reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
1.A.2 B EEPS d a tase t m ethodology
In all countries where a reliable sample frame was available (except Albania), the sample 
was selected using stratified random sampling, following the methodology explained in the 
Sampling Manual (available at http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/Methodology/). Three 
levels of stratification were used in all countries: industry, establishment size and region. 
There were no additional requirements on the ownership, exporter status, location or 
years in operation of the establishment as was the case in the previous rounds of BEEPS. 
Along the defined stratification guidelines, priority was given to completing interviews 
with establishments that participated in BEEPS 2005.
Details on the regional stratification are country-specific. In all countries, the sample 
was stratified along Manufacturing, Retail trade (sector 52) and Other services. In some of 
the countries, there were specific target numbers of interviews for more detailed sectors 
within these three groups. Size stratification was defined following the standardized 
definition for the rollout: small (5 to 19 employees), medium (20 to 99 employees), and
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INN -------INN hat
Figure 1.1: Kernel densities of actual (INNOVit) and predicted (IN  N O V a) shares of 
innovation sales
Diff I I Diff<1Opct □ □  Diff>90pct
Figure 1.2: Kernel density of the D IFFit distribution and the top/bottom deciles
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O.2 In fiscal year 2007, what percent o f  this establishment’s annual sales was accounted for by products 
or services that were introduced in the last three years?
Percent
Percent o f annual sales accounted for by new products or services ECAo2 %
Don’t know (spontaneous)
Figure 1.3: BEEPS questionnaire: IN N O V it variable
large (more than 99 employees). For stratification purposes, the number of employees 
was defined on the basis of reported permanent full-time workers. This seems to be an 
appropriate definition of the labor force, since seasonal/casual/part-time employment is 
not a common practice, except in the sectors of construction.
Survey non-response was addressed by maximizing efforts to contact establishments 
that were initially selected for interviews. Up to 4 attempts were made to contact an 
establishment for interview at different times/days of the week before a replacement 
establishment (with similar strata characteristics) was suggested for interview. Survey 
non-response did occur, but substitutions were made in order to potentially achieve strata- 
specific goals.
The surveys were implemented following a two-stage procedure. In the first stage, a 
screener questionnaire was applied over the phone to determine eligibility and to make 
appointments; in the second stage, a face-to-face interview took place with the Man­
ager/Owner/Director of each establishment.
1.A.3 FCS d a tase t m ethodology
The Financial Crisis Survey (FCS), an initiative of the Private Sector Development Vice- 
Presidency of the World Bank Group, provides a quick, short, and cost-efficient evaluation 
of the impact of the 2008 global financial crisis on private companies in European and 
Central Asian countries.
For this study, researchers contacted the same companies interviewed in 2008-2009 
Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys (BEEPS), also referred to as 
2008-2009 Enterprise Surveys (ES). Manufacturing and services private sector establish­
ments were surveyed for 2008-2009 BEEPS. The original data also served as a baseline for 
comparisons because it referred mostly to fiscal year 2007, thus measuring the pre-crisis 
scenario.
The Financial Crisis Survey was designed to follow up the same firms every six months
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during the financial crisis. The first round of FCS took place in June-July 2009, the second 
wave in February-March 2010, and the third round was implemented in June-July 2010. 
Six countries - Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Turkey - participated 
in all three waves. Companies from Kazakhstan were surveyed only in the second round.
Universe: The manufacturing sector was the primary business sector of interest [ISIC 
Rev.3.1: 15-37]. Formal (registered) companies were targeted for interviews. Firms with 
100% government ownership were excluded.
Units of Analysis: The primary sampling unit of the study was the establishment. 
An establishment is a physical location where business is carried out and where industrial 
operations take place or services are provided. A firm may be composed of one or more 
establishments. For example, a brewery may have several bottling plants and several 
establishments for distribution. For the purposes of this survey an establishment must 
make its own financial decisions and have its own financial statements separate from those 
of the firm. An establishment must also have its own management and control over its 
payroll.
Data collection mode: Computer Assisted Telephone Interview.
1. Bulgaria: For the Bulgaria Enterprise Survey 2009, the sample was selected using 
stratified random sampling. Three levels of stratification were used in this coun­
try: industry, establishment size, and region. Industry stratification was designed 
as follows: the universe was stratified into 23 manufacturing industries, 2 services 
industries (retail and IT), and one residual sector. Each sector had a target of 90 
interviews. Regional stratification was defined in six regions. These regions are 
Severozapaden, Severen Tsentralen, Severoiztochen, Yugozapaden, Yuzhen Tsen­
tralen and Yugoiztochen.
(a) I, II, III wave: 288 establishments that participated in the Bulgaria Enterprise 
Survey 2009 were contacted for The Financial Crisis Survey. The implementing 
contractor received directions that the final achieved sample should include at 
least 150 establishments.
2. Hungary: For the Hungary Enterprise Survey 2009, the sample was selected using 
stratified random sampling. Three levels of stratification were used in this country: 
industry, establishment size, and region. Industry stratification was designed as 
follows: the universe was stratified into 23 manufacturing industries, 2 services
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industries (retail and IT), and one residual sector. Each sector had a target of 90 
interviews. Regional stratification was defined in three regions. These regions are 
Central Hungary, West Hungary and East Hungary.
(a) I, II, III wave: 291 establishments that participated in the Hungary Enterprise 
Survey 2009 were contacted for The Financial Crisis Survey. The implementing 
contractor received directions that the final achieved sample should include at 
least 150 establishments.
3. Kazakhstan: The sample for the Kazakhstan Enterprise Survey 2009 was selected 
using stratified random sampling. Three levels of stratification were used: industry, 
establishment size, and oblast (region). Industry stratification was designed as 
follows: the universe was stratified into 23 manufacturing industries, 2 services 
industries (retail and IT), and one residual sector. Each sector had a target of 177 
interviews. Regional stratification was defined in five regions. These regions are 
North, West, East, South, and Central.
(a) I, II, III wave: 544 establishments that participated in the Kazakhstan Enter­
prise Survey 2009 were contacted for The Financial Crisis Survey.
4. Latvia: For the Latvia Enterprise Survey 2009, the sample was selected using strat­
ified random sampling. Three levels of stratification were used in this country: 
industry, establishment size, and region. Industry stratification was designed as 
follows: the universe was stratified into manufacturing industries, services indus­
tries, and one residual (core) sector. Each industry had a target of 90 interviews. 
For the core industries sample sizes were inflated by about 2% to account for po­
tential non-response cases when requesting sensitive financial data and also because 
of likely attrition in future surveys that would affect the construction of a panel. 
Regional stratification was defined in 6 regions. These regions are Riga, Pieriga, 
Vidzeme, Kurzeme, Zemgale, and Latgale.
(a) I, II, III wave: 271 establishments that participated in the Latvia Enterprise 
Survey 2009 were contacted for The Financial Crisis Survey. The implementing 
contractor received directions that the final achieved sample should include at 
least 120 establishments.
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5. Lithuania: For the Lithuania Enterprise Survey 2009, the sample was selected using 
stratified random sampling. Three levels of stratification were used in this country: 
industry, establishment size, and region. Industry stratification was designed as 
follows: the universe was stratified into manufacturing industries, services indus­
tries, and one residual (core) sector. Each industry had a target of 90 interviews. 
Regional stratification was defined in 4 regions. These regions are Coast and West, 
North East, South West and Vilniaus.
(a) I, II, III wave: 276 establishments that participated in the Lithuania Enterprise 
Survey 2009 were contacted for The Financial Crisis Survey. The implementing 
contractor received directions that the final achieved sample should include at 
least 120 establishments
6. Romania: For the Romania Enterprise Survey 2009, the sample was selected using 
stratified random sampling. Three levels of stratification were used in this country: 
industry, establishment size, and region. Industry stratification was as follows: 
the universe was stratified into 23 manufacturing industries, 2 services industries 
(retail and IT), and one residual sector. Each group of sectors had a target of 180 
interviews. Regional stratification was defined in eight regions. These regions are 
Nord-Est, Sud-Est, Sud, Vest, Nord-Vest, Bucuresti, Sud-Vest, and Centru.
(a) I wave: 541 establishments that participated in the Romania Enterprise Sur­
vey 2009 were contacted for The Financial Crisis Survey. The implementing 
contractor received directions that the final achieved sample should include at 
least 360 establishments.
(b) II and III wave: 536 establishments that participated in the Romania Enter­
prise Survey 2009 were contacted for The Financial Crisis Survey. The imple­
menting contractor received directions that the final achieved sample should 
include at least 360 establishments.
7. Turkey: Stratified random sampling was used in the Turkey Enterprise Survey 
2008. Three levels of stratification were implemented: industry, establishment size, 
and oblast (region). For industry stratification, the universe was divided into 5 
manufacturing industries, 1 services industry (retail), and two residual sectors. Each 
manufacturing industry had a target of 160 interviews. The services industry and 
the two residual sectors had a target of 120 interviews. For the manufacturing
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industries sample sizes were inflated by about 33% to account for potential non­
response cases when requesting sensitive financial data and also because of likely 
attrition in future surveys that would affect the construction of a panel. Regional 
stratification was defined in 5 regions. These regions are Marmara, Aegean, South, 
Central Anatolia and Black Sea-Eastern.
(a) I wave: Researchers contacted 860 manufacturing companies interviewed in 
the Turkey Enterprise Survey 2008. 514 establishments completed the ques­
tionnaire.
(b) II and III wave: 1152 establishments that participated in the Turkey Enterprise 
Survey 2008 were contacted for The Financial Crisis Survey. The implementing 
contractor received directions that the final achieved sample should include at 
least 650 establishments.
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C h ap te r  2
The im pact of m anagem ent 
quality on the innovation perform ance of firms 
in emerging countries
i
2.1 In tro d u c tio n
Recent empirical studies have revealed a positive connection between management quality 
and innovation in a number of developed countries (Kremp and Mairesse 2004; Bloom 
et al. 2014a). However, the question of what types of individual management practices 
are especially important for innovation input and which types impact innovation output 
is still open. It is also not clear whether the effects of management quality hold for 
emerging countries. This paper helps to close this gap. We study how differences in overall 
management quality and the quality of management practices affect the decisions of firms 
to invest in innovation input, i.e. to start searching for new solutions (R&D propensity), 
to accelerate their efforts (R&D intensity) and, eventually, to generate innovation output, 
i.e. introduce innovative products.
1An earlier version of this paper is published as a CERGE-EI Working Paper //555. Financial 
support from the Czech Science Foundation (GACR) project P402/10/2310 on ’Innovation, productivity 
and policy: What can we learn from micro data?’ is gratefully acknowledged. The research contributes 
to the agenda Strategie AV21. I want to thank Martin Srholec, Jan Hanousek, Sasha Prokosheva, Helena 
Schweiger, Patrick Gaulé, and Krešimir Zigič for valuable comments. All errors remaining in this text 
are the responsibility of the author.
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There are two main mechanisms that connect management quality and innovation 
output on one hand and management quality and innovation input, on the other. First, 
there is a direct influence of management on innovation output through the individual 
components of organizational and management processes. These processes support new 
technologies, new ideas, learning, solving problems, achieving results, aligning corporate 
goals and others. We can proxy a number of these individual components with relevant 
management practices that provide incentives, monitor performance, support long-term 
goals through targeting and help to improve production with operation management.
Second, there is an indirect connection between management and innovation input, 
such as R&D propensity and efforts. In other words, firms with better management 
practices, which help them to produce and commercialize products, are more likely to 
start and boost innovation in the first place.
We confirm that in the Eastern European (EE) and Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS) countries, management quality is positively connected to both innovation 
input and output. We also find that the quality of incentives and monitoring practices 
plays an important role in starting innovations and boosting innovation efforts, while 
only the quality of incentive practices is associated with better product innovations.
2.2 Literature review
Management literature has established a connection between management and firms’ 
innovation. Scholars consider management one of the components of organizational ca­
pabilities that allow firms to achieve innovation successes. Teece (1986) points out the 
importance of complementary assets and capabilities as pre-requisites for successful prod­
uct innovation and subsequent new product commercialization. The author highlights the 
role of capabilities in the production of new products and in the extraction of rents from 
innovation. Teece also suggests that the availability of these complementary assets and 
capabilities is crucial for promoting innovation efforts. Hayes, Wheelwright, and Clark 
(1988) argue that innovation depends on understanding production and management pro­
cesses specifically, as better understanding these processes is associated with innovation 
success. Teece and Pisano (1994) point out that if firms aim to support innovations, 
they need to re-structure their organizational and managerial processes to promote new 
technologies.
Researchers point out that individual management practices, such as inputs manage-
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ment, knowledge management, strategie management, organizational culture, and others 
are essential for innovative firms (see Adams, Bessant, and Phelps 2006 for an in-depth 
review of different management measures). Teece and Pisano (1994) suggest several com­
ponents of organizational and managerial processes which are important for our analysis. 
The authors point out that learning helps firms to achieve tasks related to innovation.2 
Learning practices can facilitate problem solving in product production and operations. 
These practices can be influential, supporting the introduction and production of new 
products, especially in cases of radical innovations. Teece and Pisano (1994) also argue 
that organizational processes provide incentives, connecting individual or team behavior 
to innovation and rewarding high performance. As a result, we should expect a strong 
empirical connection between incentive management and innovations.
In cases where a performance reward system is established, we should also find a 
connection between management practices that monitor individual and team performance 
and innovation output. Griffin and Hauser (1996) point out that innovation processes 
(R&D efforts) are optimal when focused on long-term goals and that different functional 
departments work well if they have similar objectives. As a result, management practices 
supporting long-term goals could be beneficial to a firm’s innovation success.
Empirical research on individual innovation management practices is a challenging 
task and scholars often focus on their presence (adoption) and quantifiable outcomes. 
Studying the quality and connections between different practices is important, but par­
ticularly difficult because of their complex qualitative nature: improvement of individual 
management practices is itself an exploratory development which influences firms’ inno­
vation performance (Birkinshaw, Hamel, and Mol 2008). Scholars analyze organizational 
and managerial factors that influence new product development both from a theoretical 
perspective (see Montoya-Weiss and Calantone 1994 and Van der Panne, van Beers, and 
Kleinknecht 2003 for relevant reviews) and in relation to individual firms (see Helper 
and Henderson 2014 for a discussion of management practices in General Motors and 
Liker 2004 in Toyota). These factors usually include management characteristics, such 
as management style, workforce management, performance management and others.
New management practices can be developed by innovating firms or adopted from a 
large pool of existing innovations (Mol and Birkinshaw 2009; Walker, Damanpour, and
2Continuous improvement, as well as Just-in-Time and Total Quality Control systems are examples of 
learning practices which have helped Japanese carmakers to achieve advantages in product development 
over their American and European competitors (Clark and Fujimoto 1989; Liker 2004)
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Devece 2010). For example, (Hamel 2006) and his colleagues identified 175 innovative 
management practices in the 20th century, such as scientific management (time and 
motion studies), cost accounting and variance analysis and many others. Firms can 
also improve the quality of existing management practices to achieve higher performance 
results (Schweiger and Friebel 2013).
There is a set of management practices that have been shown to be beneficial for a 
firm’s performance, such as quality and environmental certification (Bloom and Reenen 
2006). Kim, Kumar, and Kumar (2012) show that quality management has both direct 
and indirect positive effects on different types of innovations. Bloom et al. (2014a) and 
Bloom et al. (2014b) found a positive connection between management quality, based 
on individual practices, and innovation input (R&D) and output (patenting) using two 
different large-scale management surveys. Makri, Lane, and Gomez-Mejia (2006) find that 
CEO incentives are tightly linked to desirable innovation outputs (both in quantitative 
and qualitative terms) for firms that are actively innovating. Moreover, they find that 
incentives that explicitly rely on the desired innovation outcomes help firms to achieve 
better market performance. Lerner and Wulf (2007), who confirm a positive relationship 
between long-term compensation plans for R&D managers and innovation output, also 
support this result. They also find no relationship between long-term incentives for other 
executives who are not directly involved in innovation and innovation output.
The effects of different management practices may vary in firm, industry and country 
characteristics. For example, innovative industries focus more on people management, 
motivation and incentives, while capital-intensive industries pay attention to monitoring 
and targeting (Bloom et al. 2014b). Bloom, Schweiger, and Van Reenen (2012) found 
that the positive effects of management quality on firms’ performance hold for emerging 
countries.
Further studies are necessary to confirm whether the quality of individual management 
practices have sizable effects on innovation input and product innovation in emerging 
countries, once we control for other conditions traditionally considered in the empirical 
literature on this topic, such as technological capabilities, opportunities, trajectories and 
others (Trott 2008).
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 3 outlines the empirical model. 
Section 4 describes the dataset, key management measures and data patterns. Section 5 




The empirical model to be estimated is as follows:
RkzD,c — oíR íc +  (Rkic + 7iAíj + óiZic + line
Vic = Q̂ l-ic + B’lkir' + 72-^í + + O^nk^Dic + U2ic
(2.1)
(2.2)
where R&DiC -  is a measure of innovation input (R&D spending per employee) and ?/ic 
output (new products introduced) of firm i in country c, & -  the logarithm of labor, kic -  
the logarithm of capital; Mi -  the measure of management quality (aggregate quality of 
management and four different management practices); - other control variables which 
affect innovation, such as workforce characteristics (share of employees with university 
degrees and the average weekly hours worked), firm characteristics (firm age and whether 
it is listed on a national or international market), a set of two-digit industry, country 
and year dummies in which interviews were conducted (2008, 2009, 2010). See Table 2.6 
- Table 2.10 of the Appendix for a complete set of variables with summary statistics. 
Mie-, U2ic - error terms.
We use two model specifications:
1. We include only an aggregate measure of the management quality to test whether 
this variable is connected to different measures of innovation input and output.
2. We include quality measures for four individual management practices (operations, 
monitoring, targeting, incentives) to test their effects on innovation measures.
According to the design, model (1) is nested in model (2). We also provide formal tests, 
which compare different model specifications.
It is important to note that the analysis can reveal only conditional correlations. 
Although a causal relationship between management quality and innovation indicators 
is likely to exist, it is not possible to control for possible endogeneity and to measure 
precise causal effects. In the empirical specification, we use control variables presented in 
Table 2.3. We use a dummy variable for the EU to separate the fixed effects of European 
countries on innovation input and output variables (see Table 2.4 for a complete list of 
the Eastern European and CIS countries).
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2.4 D ata
An empirical study of the relationship between management and innovations is a chal­
lenging task because large cross-country surveys covering both topics in detail are scarce. 
Recently, there have been a number of attempts to improve data collection on innova­
tion (Mairesse and Mohnen 2010). Community Innovation Surveys (CIS) have helped 
researchers to study the innovation activity of European firms and some non-member 
nations (Canada, USA, and others). Although CIS does not include questions related 
to management quality, they cover a number of questions about the introduction of new 
business practices (organizational innovation). There are a number of empirical studies 
based on CIS data (see, for example, Mol and Birkinshaw (2009) who analyzed drivers of 
management changes based on the UK Innovation Survey). In this study, we will focus 
on a unique survey which contains data on management quality and innovation (input 
and output) in the context of emerging countries.
In October 2008 -  November 2009, the European Bank for Reconstruction and De­
velopment (EBRD) and the World Bank conducted a Management, Organization and 
Innovation (MOI) Survey3, based on recommendations from works by Bloom and Reenen 
(2006), and Bloom and Reenen (2010). Details on sampling methodology are presented 
in Appendix 2. A.3. The managers of about 1,400 firms from 10 emerging countries in the 
Eastern Europe and CIS countries (Belarus, Bulgaria, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, Russia, Serbia, Ukraine and Uzbekistan) were interviewed face-to-face. The 
organizers conducted the survey in the Russian Far East between February and April 
2010. The survey focused mainly on production and operation activities, which include 
four groups of management practices: operations, monitoring, targeting and incentives. 
Up to now, MOI has remained one of the few datasets that allow researchers to study 
the relationships between management quality and innovation in emerging countries.
The data consists of information from manufacturing firms with between 10 and 5,500 
employees. All monetary values have been converted to constant 2005 international US 
dollars. Original MOI data do not include financial information, however EBRD provided 
us with an additional dataset, in which completed MOI survey interviews are matched 
to balance sheets and income and loss statements from the Bureau Van Dijk’s Orbis 
database (see Appendix 2.A.4 for details on merging). Based on the merged data, we
3EBRD-World Bank Management, Organization and Innovation (MOI) Survey dataset is available at 
http://www.ebrd.coni/what-we-do/econoniic-research-and-data/data/moi.html
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use the measure of physical capital (fixed assets per employee) and the firm’s efficiency 
(return on total assets, ROTA), which are the factors influencing a firm’s performance. 
As a result, they could be an important factor affecting innovation decisions (Crepon, 
Duguet, and Mairesse 1998; Mohnen and Hall 2014). Unfortunately, financial data are 
missing for some Orbis data, which leads to a sample reduction in the merged dataset by 
about 36%4. As a result, we will use financial variables for robustness checks and focus 
mainly on the full merged dataset.
An average firm in our sample has about 216 permanent full-time and part-time 
employees. Firm size is an essential parameter to control, as firms may benefit from 
economies of scale (Earl and Gault 2004; Huergo and Jaumandreu 2004). The average 
share of employees with higher education is 27.5%, which is a measure of human capital 
quality. Employees serve as an internal source of knowledge, which has a positive impact 
on innovation outcomes (Dakhli and Clercq 2004; Elche-Hotelano 2011). Further, we 
control for the firm’s age (an average firm in the dataset is 32 years old), as newer firms 
tend to be more innovative (Huergo and Jaumandreu 2004). Further, we control for 
the firm’s legal status, as successful innovation may benefit from stable share-holding 
arrangements, which can provide incentives for top management and effectively delegate 
monitoring (Soskice 1997). About 26% of the firms in our sample are share-holding 
companies with shares traded on the national or international stock markets. About 8% 
have foreign firms or individuals as their largest owners.
Foreign-owned firms can often have lower innovation costs and higher R&D efforts due 
to better access to new technologies, lower costs of financing and better organizational 
practices (Guadalupe, Kuzmina, and Thomas 2012). In addition, we control whether 
firms have a high-speed internet connection at their premises, as one of the measures 
of technological capability (Kim 1997). Other variables include weekly working hours of 
permanent full-time employees to control for effectiveness of human resource management 
(Laursen and Foss 2003). We also control for firm location (whether a firm is located 
in a capital city) as geographical concentration is linked to knowledge externalities and 
availability of skilled labor, and therefore to innovation propensity (Audretsch and Feld­
man 1996). As market environment can be an important innovation driver, therefore we 
account for market competition with imports from abroad.
4As described in the Appendix 2.A.4, Orbis database was used as a sample frame, but if the source 
was not available or of poor quality, official sample frames were used without financial performance 
information.
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We examine innovation input and output in terms of:
1. Decisions of firms to engage in R&D (i.e. whether a firm has invested in R&D). In 
our sample about 38% of firms invested in R&D in the last complete fiscal year of 
the study.
2. Decisions of firms to accelerate research efforts - R&D intensity (R&D spending per 
employee). Among the firms that engaged in R&D, the average amount invested 
was about USD 400 of constant USD 2005 per employee) in the last complete fiscal 
year of the study.
3. Innovation output as new products introduced over the last three years of the study 
(a binary variable). In our sample, on average about 70.8% of firms introduced new 
products over last 3 years. This share is higher for firms that invested in R&D 
research (92.0%), than those which did not (57.9%). The difference in the means of 
these groups is significantly different from zero according to the two-sample t-test 
with equal variances (t = -11.3, 830 d.o.f.).
Following Bloom and Reenen (2006) and Bloom, Schweiger, and Van Reenen (2012) 
we group questions into four main categories: operations (one question), monitoring 
(seven questions), targets (one question) and incentives (three questions). The operations 
question aims to answer how firms deal with process problems. Monitoring questions 
reveal the use of production performance indicators. The target questions cover the 
setting of time targets. Incentives questions are related to employee reward, promotion 
and dealing with poor performance.
The survey includes mainly closed questions. With regard to monitoring, we drop one
question, as it has a substantial share of missing values. The questionnaire was tested
in two pilot surveys in the USA and Ukraine, and in the UK before implementation
in the MOI survey. The questions included in the analysis are presented in Appendix
1. Although in general the definition of "good" and "bad" practice can be subjective
and may differ by countries, Nicholas Bloom and John Van Reenen, the organizers of
the MOI survey, focus on practices which have a straightforward meaning, so that the
quality of each practice can be revealed based on responses to the survey.0 Following
5For example, for Incentives question R.7 "How do you reward this establishment’s production target 
achievement?", management score and the quality of practice increases from "There are no rewards" 
(score = 1), to "Only top and middle management is rewarded" (score = 2) and finally "All staff is 
rewarded" (score = 0). Other questions follow a similar logic; nevertheless, one might possibly think of 
other score combinations for quality increase.
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the suggestions of Bloom, Schweiger, and Van Reenen (2012) for the MOI survey, we 
assign scores to responses for each management question such that a higher score means 
higher quality of the management practice analyzed. Although this assignment might 
look somewhat subjective, survey organizers tried to formulate the questions so that the 
answers could be ranked, and we follow their recommendations. Further, we calculate 
z-scores by normalizing scores for each question to mean zero and standard deviation 
one6. Normalization is a necessary step, because each question could have a different 
number of answers, and thus, we would need to normalize answers in order to make them 
comparable:
where zmi is the z-score of a question nt; in firm i, m.̂  is an unweighted average of a 
respective question across all countries; crm. is a standard deviation of a question across 
all countries.
Second, the z-scores were combined into management practices as a non-weighted 
average, thus we want to aggregate relevant questions into four distinctive groups:
1
n m itp m&P
(2.4)
where is the unweighted average of questions, belonging to one of four management 
practices P  (operations, monitoring, targets or incentives) in firm i; nmiP denotes number 
of observations.
Further, we construct an aggregate measure of the management quality as a non- 
weighted average of all four practices as our aim is to have one measure of management 
quality instead of four. In this case, all management practices have an equal contribution 
to this final measure.
^ i  operations F  m onitoring F  U p,targets F  P p ,in cen tives} (2-5)
Finally, we calculate the z-scores for M; to compare management practices across firms. 
If the value of the z-score is positive, it indicates management practice above average
6This is a standard way to calculate aggregate measures of management quality, widely used in other 
surveys, such as Management and Organizational Practices Survey (MOPS) and World Management 
Survey (WMS). There could be other approaches.
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("good" practice); the opposite is true for negative values ("bad" practice).
Z Mi = Mi =
M j -  M j 
a Mi
(2.6)
Essential summary statistics for the z-scores (aggregate and by different practices), coun­
try dummies, year dummies, two-digit industries dummies as well as other variables in 
the dataset, which we describe further on, are presented in Tables 2.6-2.10 of the ap­
pendix. Comparison of the aggregate management z-scores across the surveyed countries 
is presented in Figure 2.1.
As expected, most EU countries take higher values of the aggregate management 
z-scores than CIS countries. Surprisingly, Ukraine shows above average management 
quality and Lithuania is below average. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have the worst 
management score of all surveyed countries. For example, in EU countries the mean 
z-score is 0.168 (median = 0.270), while for CIS countries the average z-score is -0.113 
(median = -0.001). The difference in means is different from zero at a 1% level (t=-3.71). 
Therefore, in EU countries variations in management quality might have different effects 
than in CIS countries, which have relatively poorer management. We would like to study 
these differences in our analysis.
The diffusion of four management practices by firm size (small, medium, large, extra- 
large business) is depicted in Figure 2.2. We see that, in general, management practices 
are positively connected to firm size. For very small firms, formal management practices 
are of lesser importance. As the size increases, it becomes more difficult for managers to 
have direct influence on day-to-day production processes, communication with external 
sources, innovation activities and other tasks. As a result, managers must rely on formal 
practices to manage the growing firm. This finding is in line with existing literature 
(Bloom et al. 2014a; Kremp and Mairesse 2004; Earl and Gault 2004).
The diffusion of four management practices by R&D propensity (No -  do not invest 
in R&D; Yes -  invest in R&D) and by the introduction of new products (No -  no new 
products are introduced, Yes -  new products are introduced) are presented in Figure 2.3. 
The chart suggests a positive connection between the quality of individual management 
practices and the decision of firms to invest in R&D as well as innovation output in 
terms of new products introduced, across all management practices. We see that firms 
which invest in R&D and introduce product innovations have higher quality management 
practices. This observation is in line with Kremp and Mairesse’s (2004) findings for
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Average management z-scores
Figure 2.1: Management scores across countries by average management z-score
I I Operations I I Monitoring I I Targets I I Incentives 
Source: Own calculations based on the EBRD and World Bank MOI survey
Figure 2.2: Diffusion of management practices by firm size
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French manufacturing firms. As a result, our data contains explicit patterns connecting 
management quality and innovation, which we would like to study in detail using an 
empirical model, described in the previous section.
2.5 R esu lts
In this section, we present our findings of how management quality affects innovation 
for two basic specifications: aggregate management quality (models 1.1, 1.2, 3) and 
quality of individual management practices (models 2.1, 2.2, 4) in Table 2.1.7 Table 2.1 
presents raw effects for R&D propensity, R&D intensity, combined in a two-part model, 
and the introduction of new products. The two-part model estimates the effects on 
R&D propensity and intensity using different underlying processes -  logit for propensity 
equation, for the intensity equation -  a generalized linear model (GLM) with logarithm 
of dependent variable for values greater than zero.
We find that R&D propensity strongly increases with the aggregate measure of man­
agement quality (model 1.1), although the effect of R&D intensity is not statistically 
significant. That is, if the management z-score grows from the 25 percentile to the me­
dian value (which is equivalent to an increase in z-score from -0.67 to 0.12), the probability 
of positive R&D spending increases by 3.3 percentage points (see Table 2.2, Model 1.1). 
At the same time, the combined expected value of positive R&D spending increases by 
2.3 percentage points A pairwise comparison of the estimated marginal z-scores at 25 per­
centile and the median is statistically significant at a 1% significance level. If we keep in 
mind that the normalized z-scores of aggregate management quality range from roughly 
-4.0 to 2.0 for all firms in the data sample, the result is quite strong.
It is worth noting that EE countries have on average a higher level of both R&D 
propensity and intensity. Figure 2.4 (left chart) demonstrates the changes in the predicted 
probability of R&D with different levels of management quality for the EE and CIS 
countries. We have also tried specifications with an interaction term between region and 
management quality to determine whether the change in management is associated with
7After initial evaluation of statistical significance for fixed assets per employee and ROTA, we find 
that these variables are insignificant in innovation propensity and intensity equations, which is in line 
with the findings of Kremp and Mairesse (2004). As in their case, coefficients are similar when we both 
include and exclude these variables; at the same time, the effects of management are less significant and 
lower. In the final estimation, we exclude fixed assets per employee and ROTA variables relying on a 
more parsimonious model and a larger sample. The estimates with fixed assets per employee and ROTA 
variables are available from the author upon request.
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Table 2.1: Regression: R&D, R&D Intensity, New produets introduced
TPM (R&D spen.) TPM (R&D spen.) Logit (New prod.)
(1-1) (1-2) (2-1) (2-2) (3) (4)
Management z-score 0.249** 0.075 0.203
(0.097) (0.058) (0.128)
Operations z-score -0.033 -0.001 0.110
(0.111) (0.076) (0.140)
Incentives z-score 0.376** -0.059 0.029
(0.159) (0.089) (0.213)
Targeting z-score -0.019 0.122** -0.043
(0.097) (0.061) (0.142)
Monitoring z-score 0.464*** 0.036 0.453**
(0.171) (0.113) (0.209)
EU 0.905** 0.363 0.944** 0.289 0.652 0.785
(0.442) (0.258) (0.447) (0.256) (0.966) (0.990)
Ln(Labour) 0.268** -0.082 0.289** -0.091* 0.312* 0.318*
(0.129) (0.057) (0.132) (0.055) (0.173) (0.175)
ln(R&D spen.) 5.987 5.905
(3.880) (3.844)
Country and Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo 7?2 0.113 0.126 0.165 0.173
Prob> Chi2 <0.001 <0.001 0.036 0.052
Observations 699 177 699 177 387 387
Standard errors in parentheses
Source: Author’s calculations based on the EBRD and World Bank MOI survey 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 2.2: Parewise comparison at 25th percentile (mgmz) and median(mgmz)
b se z P
Model (1.1). R&D propensity
1. Management z-score (25th percentile) 0.195 0.019 10.24 < 0.001
2. Management z-score (median) 0.2278 0.018 12.84 < 0.001
Pairwise comparison 1. & 2. 0.033 0.012 2.65 0.008
Model (1.1-1.2 combined). R&D spending
1. Management z-score (25th percentile) 0.057 0.013 4.32 0.000
2. Management z-score (median) 0.061 0.014 5.65 0.000
Pairwise comparison 1. & 2. 0.023 0.011 2.21 0.027
Model (3). New product
1. Management z-score (25th percentile) 0.728 0.057 12.87 < 0.001
2. Management z-score (median) 0.759 0.051 14.94 < 0.001
Pairwise comparison 1. & 2. 0.031 0.020 1.53 0.126
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different R&D probability for the two regions. The results indicate that this term was 
not statistically significant in any specification, therefore we do not include it in the final 
models.
Among individual practices (model 2 of Table 2.1) the quality of monitoring and incen­
tives have strong positive effects, as expected. At the same time, the quality of operations 
and targeting practices have no statistically significant effects on R&D propensity. In our 
dataset, operations and targeting have the least variation among all management prac­
tices, as each of them has only one underlying question, and, as a result, they depend 
heavily on exact wording. As discussed above, we expect that firms which effectively 
work on solutions to production problems are more likely to become innovators. The 
operation question in the MOI survey focuses on the general handling of a wide range 
of problems in production processes (i.e. machinery breakdown, human error, etc.; see 
Appendix 2.A.2 for further details). Although responses to this question could provide 
a good approximation of how firms solve operational problems, in fact 97.1% of answers 
(810 of 834) concentrate in two scores with the highest quality out of four. In both cases 
firms "fix it [problem] and take measures to ensure that it does not happen again". The 
difference in answers for these two scores comes from the "availability of a continuous 
improvement process to anticipate problems". As a result, the actual variation in answers 
might not be sufficient to reveal the quality of operation practices and their connection 
to innovation processes.
As in the case of operations management practices, the model shows that target 
practices have no statistically significant effects on R&D propensity, but it is the only 
group of practices, which matters for R&D intensity. Although the survey question relates 
to the "production targets for its main product", it could be a good approximation of 
a corporate goal-setting strategy. Further studies are necessary to confirm whether this 
result persists.
For both model specifications, we find that firm size, quality of human capital, the 
quality of information technology and business practices (measured by the availability of 
high-speed internet connection on a firm’s premises) and market pressure from imports 
are positively associated with R&D propensity.
A formal Likelihood Ratio specification test suggests that we can reject this hypothesis 
at a 5% significance level, and thus, model (2) is preferred (see Table 2.3).
The combined expected value of R&D spending for different values of management 
quality is depicted in Figure 3 (middle chart). The overall result is consistent with a recent
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I I Operations I I Monitoring I I Targets I II Incentives I I Operations I I Monitoring I I Targets I II Incentives
Source: Own calculations based on the EBRD and World Bank MOI survey
Figure 2.3: Diffusion of management practices by R&D propensity and new product 
introduction
R&D R&D spending New products
Management z-score
—©— non-EU countries 
—• — EU countries
Management z-score
—©— non-EU countries 
—• — EU countries
Management z-score
—©— non-EU countries 
—• — EU countries
Figure 2.4: Predicted values of R&D propensity and R&D intensity for different man­
agement z-score values
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study by Bloom et al. (2014a) based on a survey of about 30,000 US plants, in which the 
authors suggest that establishments with higher management scores show significantly 
higher innovation activity measured by R&D spending per employee.
Among individual practices (model 2.1 of Tables 2.1) the quality of monitoring and 
incentives have strong positive effects in the R&D propensity model, as expected. At 
the same time, the quality of targeting practices is statistically significant in the model 
for R&D intensity (model 2.2 of Tables 2.1). It is likely that the incentive component
Table 2.3: Specification tests for exclusion of four individual management practices
N LRtest A IC B IC
Model (1.1 1.2) R&D (constrained) 699 1486.68
Model (2.1 2.2) R&D (unconstrained) 699 14.22* 1512.75
Model (3) New product (constrained) 387 466.52 585.27
Model (4) New product (unconstrained) 387 3.60 468.93 599.55
plays an important role, as the complexity of innovation process requires a different set 
of incentives than in the production process. In the MOI survey, incentives management 
has a wide definition and can be applied to business processes in general. Kremp and 
Mairesse (2004), for example, use a different set of questions to define knowledge manage­
ment practices. One of these practices (incentive policy to retain employees), can be, in 
a wide sense, considered incentives management. The authors find that incentives have 
significant positive effects on both innovation propensity and intensity. Other manage­
ment practices are not statistically significant from zero, indicating that they may play 
a more limited role in decisions about the amounts firms are willing to spend on R&D.
A formal Likelihood Ratio specification test suggests that we can reject this hypothe­
sis at a 5% significance level, and thus, model (2) is weakly preferred (see Table 2.3). In 
the next step, we consider whether management quality is associated with better inno­
vation output: whether new products are introduced. We estimate the models by logit 
regression and present the results in Table 2.1 (models 3 and 4). The effect of the aggre­
gate management quality (model 3) is statistically insignificant at a 5% level. If we look 
at Figure 2.4 (right chart), which depicts the predictive margin of innovation output for 
different values of management quality, it suggests that although management quality 
positively affects the probability of new product introduction, increasing management 
quality is marginal and there is no difference between the EE and CIS countries.
If we look at individual management practices (model 6), we find that only monitoring 
management quality has a statistically significant effect (at a 5% significance level), while
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the coefficients of other management practices are not significant.
A Likelihood Ratio specification test (see Table 2.3) cannot reject the hypothesis that 
model (4) is nested in model (3). Therefore, adding the quality of individual management 
practices as predictor variables does not lead to an improvement in the model fit. We 
find that in all specifications, R&D spending and market pressure from imports play a 
sizable positive role, and the coefficient is statistically significant at the 10% and 5% 
levels, respectively. This result confirms earlier findings of the importance of R&D and 
perceived market competition for innovation output (Kremp and Mairesse 2004; Mohnen, 
P. and Dagenais, M. 2002; Mohnen, Mairesse, and Dagenais 2006).
Although we expected that the quality of all management practices would play an 
important role for new product introduction in emerging countries, we did not find sup­
port for this hypothesis in the empirical results. This result calls for further empirical 
research:
1. Can this result be confirmed for emerging countries if a stricter definition of man­
agement quality practices is applied?
2. Does this result hold for developed countries? A comparative study would allow us 
to find out of whether business environment factors intensify or weaken the positive 
effects of management quality.
3. Can the effects of individual management practice quality on innovation output 
be indirect -  through the innovation input? This hypothesis would be consistent 
with the findings of Cantner and Joel (2007) that the direct effects of knowledge 
management on innovation success are not significant, while the indirect impact 
through innovation input and cooperation is sizable.
4. Is it possible to confirm a causal relationship between the improvement of manage­
ment quality and innovation?
2.5.1 Industry z-score norm alization
It is possible to argue that measures of management quality might differ across manu­
facturing sectors. For example, the management quality achieved by top firms in certain 
sectors might be considered mediocre in others. The differences in management z-scores 
by industries on average are not substantial at maximum values (i.e. ’best’ management
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quality), but are striking in terms of minimum values (i.e. ’worst’ management qual­
ity). Some sectors, such as electronics, have relatively higher values. We would like to 
account for these differences and normalize scores by firms in each sector (2-digit code) 
separately. Estimation results in Table 2.4 show that the main conclusions, described
Table 2.4: Regression: Management quality, normalized by industries
TPM  (R&D spen. TPM  (R&D spen.) Logit (New prod.)
(5-1) (5-2) (6-1) (6-2) (7) (8)
Management z-score 0.252*** 0.067 0.215*
(0.097) (0.059) (0.127)
Operations z-score -0.031 -0.006 0.113
(0.110) (0.076) (0.141)
Incentives z-score 0.401** -0.065 0.036
(0.157) (0.088) (0.212)
Targeting z-score -0.019 0.121** -0.041
(0.097) (0.061) (0.140)
Monitoring z-score 0.445*** 0.035 0.438**
(0.171) (0.113) (0.205)
EU 0.908** 0.365 0.945** 0.292 0.653 0.776
(0.442) (0.258) (0.447) (0.256) (0.961) (0.987)
Ln(Labour) 0.267** -0.081 0.289** -0.090* 0.310* 0.317*
(0.129) (0.056) (0.132) (0.055) (0.173) (0.175)
ln(R&D spenind) 5.986 5.910
(3.874) (3.852)
Country and Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo 7?2 0.113 0.127 0.166 0.172
Prob> C hi2 <0.001 <0.001 0.035 0.052
Observations 699 177 699 177 387 387
Standard errors in parentheses
Source: A uthor’s calculations based on the EBRD and World Bank MOI survey 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
in detail in the previous section, hold both numerically and qualitatively when we take 
sector-specific characteristics of management quality into account. A possible advantage 
of accounting for industry differences is in the model (7), which studies the relationship 
between aggregate management quality and new product introduction. In this model the 
effect of management quality becomes significant at a 10% level and higher in size, as 
compared to the results in Table 2.1.
2.5.2 Q uality asym m etry  analysis
In this section we study asymmetries in the relationship between management quality, 
R&D and innovation output. For this purpose, we use a piecewise regression to determine 
whether low or high aggregate relative quality of management has a stronger connection
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to innovation. As management quality M is the main variable of interest, we use splines 
to distinguish between below (low) and above (high) mean management quality. Results 
are presented in Table 2.5.
Table 2.5: Regression: Quality asymmetries
TPM (R&D spen.) TPM (R&D spen.) Logit (New prod.)
(9-1) (9-2) (io.i) (10-2) (11) (12)
Management z-score <0 0.513*** 0.147 0.132
(0.178) (0.110) (0.233)
Management z-score >0 -0.059 -0.003 0.338
(0.222) (0.140) (0.316)
Operations z-score <0 0.335 -0.155 0.045
(0.368) (0.176) (0.403)
Operations z-score >0 -0.575 0.181 0.232
(0.551) (0.279) (0.620)
Incentives z-score <0 0.879*** 0.413*** 0.024
(0.326) (0.151) (0.349)
Incentives z-score >0 -0.326 -0.699*** 0.069
(0.401) (0.247) (0.495)
Targeting z-score <0 0.295 0.173 0.145
(0.241) (0.134) (0.349)
Targeting z-score >0 -0.290 0.071 -0.210
(0.214) (0.134) (0.304)
Monitoring z-score <0 0.306 -0.051 0.411
(0.236) (0.162) (0.289)
Monitoring z-score >0 0.648* 0.170 0.394
(0.373) (0.244) (0.527)
EU 0.925** 0.376 0.982** 0.320 0.629 0.737
(0.438) (0.256) (0.450) (0.252) (0.955) (0.998)
Ln(Labour) 0.270** -0.080 0.285** -0.085 0.302* 0.309*
(0.129) (0.056) (0.132) (0.056) (0.175) (0.175)
ln(R&D spening) 6.019 5.794
(3.863) (3.785)
Country and Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo 7?2 0.117 0.136 0.166 0.173
Prob> y2 <0.001 <0.001 0.040 0.100
Observations 699 177 699 177 387 387
Standard errors in parentheses
Source: Author’s calculations based on the EBRD and World Bank MOI survey 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
In most cases, a positive relationship between management quality and R&D holds 
only for firms with low quality management, and for this group the size of the effect is 
greater. At the same time, for firms with high management quality, the relationship is 
mixed and, in the case of incentives management, even negative (see models 9.1 - 10.2). If 
we look at the relationship between management quality and innovation output (models 
11-12), the effect of management quality is statistically insignificant.
This result suggests that this relationship might be weak and could be sensitive to the
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model specification and quality (z-score) interval under consideration. In general, asym­
metry analysis shows that the relationship between management quality and innovation 
input is of high importance for firms with below average management quality, while firms 
with higher quality management might not enjoy innovation acceleration associated with 
better management.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper explicitly focuses on connections between the quality of aggregate manage­
ment, individual management practices and innovation (input and output) in the East­
ern European and CIS countries. The empirical analysis presented in the paper helps 
to explain whether management quality, associated with firms’ operations, affects R&D 
propensity, R&D intensity and the introduction of new products. This study provides 
evidence that better aggregate management quality is associated with a higher propen­
sity of firms to invest in R&D and while the effect on intensity of their R&D spending 
is not statistically significant. The effects of management quality on the introduction 
of new products are positive, this relationship is weak and the improvement of manage­
ment quality is not directly related to a significant increase in the probability of new 
product introduction. As a result, although management quality does not guarantee the 
successful introduction of new products, it may have an indirect positive result through 
higher R&D propensity and intensity. The results hold after controlling for differences 
in management quality by industries. Quality asymmetry analysis strongly suggests that 
the relationship between management quality and innovation input is sizable for firms 
with low management quality, while for firms with high management quality it becomes 
statistically insignificant. The MOI survey has certain limitations, as it includes a limited 
set of questions for each management practice and does not provide a large coverage of de­
veloped economies for comparative analysis. Therefore, further studies analyzing quality 
management practices using wider definitions of management are needed. These would 
help to establish the direct and indirect links between management practices and the 
innovation output of different firms. For example, in the case of small firms, innovation 
in management can serve as a substitute for investments in R&D (Rammer, Czarnitzki, 
and Spielkamp 2009).
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2.A A ppend ix
2.A.1 Sum m ary S tatistics
Table 2.6: Summary Statistics: Main Variables
(1)
count min max mean sd
Management z-score 834 -4.008 1.841 -0.023 1.032
Operations z-score 834 -4.497 0.814 -0.001 0.995
Monitoring z-score 834 -2.433 1.142 -0.028 0.676
Targeting z-score 834 -1.972 1.332 -0.018 1.005
Incentives z-score 834 -2.448 0.723 -0.025 0.680
ln(R&D spending—1) 699 0 1.795 0.065 0.214
R&D 834 0 1 0.376 0.485
New Products introduced 832 0 1 0.708 0.455
Table 2.7: Summary Statistics: Controls
(1)
count min max mean sd
Ln(Labour) 834 3.401 7.937 4.944 0.844
Higher education (share) 834 0 1 0.275 0.223
Ln(Firm’s Age) 834 0 5.342 3.048 0.948
Shareholding company (traded) 834 0 1 0.259 0.438
Ln(Perm. FT emp. weekly hours) 834 3.178 4.094 3.715 0.088
Capital city 834 0 1 0.291 0.455
Foreign (largest owner) 834 0 1 0.082 0.274
High-speed Internet 834 0 1 0.829 0.377
Pressure from imports 834 0 1 0.683 0.465
Ln(Fixed Assets. 2008) 504 -9.390 5.522 1.536 1.768
ROTA (2008) 503 -79.48 75.91 3.614 16.519
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Table 2.8: Summary Statistics: Countries
EU status Country frequency percent

















Table 2.10: Summary Statistics: Industries
(1)
frequency percent





Plastics and Rubber 34 4.08
Non Metallic Mineral Products 63 7.55
Basic Metals 7 0.84
Fabricate Metal Products 107 12.83




2 .A .2 M anagem ent P ractices: Core Q uestions
Table 2.11: Operations R.l. What normally happens when a process problem arises, 





Nothing is done about it. 1 1
We fix it but do not take further measures. 2 2
We fix it and we take measures to make sure
that it does not happen again.
We fix it and we take measures to make sure
Ó Ó
that it does not happen again and we also have 





Table 2.12: Targets R.4. What is the timescale of this establishment’s production 





The main focus is on short-term (less than one year)
production targets for the main product.
There are short- and long-term (more than three years)
1 z
production targets for the main product, 
but they are set independently.
2 3
There are integrated short- and long-term production Q 4
targets for the main product.
There are no production targets set for the main 4 1
product.
Don’t know -9 1
Refusal -8
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Table 2.13: Incentives R.7. How do you reward this establishment’s production target 
achievement?
Score in questionnaire Management score
There are no rewards. 1 1
Only top and middle management 2 2
is rewarded.
All staff is rewarded. 3 3
Don’t know -9
Refusal -8
Table 2.14: Incentives 0.14. Which of the following best corresponds to the main way 





Promotions are based solely on individual’s
effort and ability.
Promotions are based partly on individual’s
ó
efforts and ability, and partly on other factors 9
such as tenure (how long they have worked 
at the firm.
Promotions are based mainly on factors other 




Does not apply -7
Don’t know -9
Table 2.15: Incentives 0.15. Which of the following best corresponds to this establish­






They are rarely or never moved from their x x
position.
They usually stay in their positions for at least a 2 2
year before action is taken.
They are rapidly helped and re-trained, and




Does not apply -7
Don’t know -9
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Table 2.16: Monitoring R.2a. How many production performance indicators are moni­






One or two production performance indicators 9 9
(for example, volume and quality).
More than two production performance indicators. 3 3
Don’t know -9 1
Refusal -8
Table 2.17: Monitoring R.2b. How frequently are these production performance indi­
cators collected in this establishment?







Don’t know -9 1
Never 0
Table 2.18: Monitoring R.2c. How frequently are production performance indicators 
shown to factory managers?









Other 10 depends on answer
Don’t know -9
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Table 2.19: Monitoring R.2d. How frequently are production performance indicators 
shown to workers?









Other 10 depends on answer
Don’t know -9 1
Table 2.20: Monitoring R.3. How often are production performance indicators reviewed 
by top or middle managers?
Score in questionnaire Management score
They are continually reviewed. 1 3
They are periodically reviewed. 2 2
They are rarely reviewed. 3 1
Don’t know -9 1
Refusal -8
Table 2.21: Monitoring R.6. Does this establishment use any production performance 
indicators to compare different teams of employees in the production line, in different 
shifts, or similar?





2 .A .3 M O I sam pling m ethod ology
MOI sampling methodology8 uses a random sample representative of the manufacturing 
sector and ensures large enough sample sizes for the manufacturing sector to condusct 
statistically robust analyses with levels of precision at a minimum 7.5% precision for 90% 
confidence intervals about the differences in management practices across countries.
The Management, Organisation and Innovation (MOI) survey includes (according 
to ISIC, revision 3.1) all manufacturing sectors (group D). The sample frame for each 
country should include only establishments with at least fifty (50) but less than 5000 
employees. The survey was administered face-to-face, with generally the same person -  
the factory, production or operation manager - responding to all sections.
If available and of sufficient quality in terms of representativeness of the manufac­
turing sector, the preferred sample frame was Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis database, which 
contained published balance sheet and profit and loss statements. When this source is 
not available or is of poor quality, the official sample frames (Business Environment and 
Enterprise Performance Survey, see https://ebrd-beeps.com/ for details) without finan­
cial performance information can be used. The sample frame downloaded from Orbis 
was cleaned by the EBRD through the addition of regional variables, updating addresses 
and phone numbers of companies. MOI (ORBIS) sample frame was not available for 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, so BEEPS sample frame was used there. No stratification 
was used in the majority of the countries, but the sample was selected randomly, and 
covered all regions and at least a 25 per cent response rate was a requirement.
MOI survey also added location as another dimension to the sampling strategy, en­
suring that the sample frame was stratified by region, where the laws and regulations 
that might have an impact on management practices vary across regions. Stratification 
along industries (two-digit codes) within manufacturing and establishment size were not 
required for MOI sampling design.
Item non-response was addressed by two strategies:
• For sensitive questions that may generate negative reactions from the respondent, 
such as ownership information, enumerators were instructed to collect the refusal 
to respond as (-8).
• Establishments with incomplete information were re-contacted in order to com-
8These are adapted excerpts from the official MOI survey sampling methodology, available at 
http://www.ebrd.coni/downloads/research/econoniics/nioiniethodology.pdf.
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plete this information, whenever necessary. However, there were clear cases of low 
response.
Survey non-response was addressed by maximizing efforts to contact establishments 
that were initially selected for interviews. Up to 15 attempts (but at least 4 attempts) 
were made to contact an establishment for interview at different times/days of the week 
before a replacement establishment (with similar characteristics) was suggested for inter­
view. Survey non-response did occur, but substitutions were made in order to potentially 
achieve the goals.
2.A .4 M erging M OI and  ORBIS d a tase ts
The merged MOI-ORBIS dataset comes from EBRD and was also used in the paper by 
Schweiger and Friebel (2013). The authors write "We were able to perfectly match the 
survey data back to the Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis database on the basis of the Bureau 
van Dijk’s firm identification number, which was included in the survey data. The latter 
also included the name, address and phone number of the firm, and we cross-checked the 
firm names and addresses manually after the matching. In some of the countries that did 
not use Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis database as a sample frame, we were able to find some 
of the firms in the Orbis database on the basis of their name, industry and address at a 
later date when the coverage in Orbis improved" (Schweiger and Friebel 2013, p.23).
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C h ap te r  3
Political Risk, Inform ation and C orruption 
Cycles: Evidence from Russian Regions
1 Co-authored with Dmitriy Vorobyev
3.1 In tro d u c tio n
There is plentiful evidence showing that politicians change their behavior during terms of 
office in systematic ways. This is particularly true for elected politicians: in pre-election 
periods, elected incumbents tend to increase public expenditures, shift the composition of 
expenditures towards more publicly visible projects, stimulate job creation, release overly 
optimistic economic forecasts, and increase overt anti-corruption activities. However, 
evidence of clear patterns in the behavior of appointed politicians is scarce. In this 
paper, using Russian regional data, we demonstrate that political cycles substantially 
affect the incentives of appointed officials to engage in corrupt activities in completely 
different ways than they affect elected officials.
Opportunistic behavior by elected politicians is empirically well documented in both 
developed and developing countries. A large body of research focuses on the patterns
XA previous version of this paper was published as CERGE-EI working paper No.539. The work 
on this study was supported by an individual grant N 13-0512 from the Economics Education and 
Research Consortium, Inc. (EERC), with funds provided by the Global Development Network and the 
Government of Sweden. We would like to thank Michael Alexeev, Patrick Gaulé, Jan Hanousek, Štěpán 
Jurajda, Joaquin Artés and participants of EERC research workshops for useful comments. All remaining 
errors in this text are the responsibility of the authors.
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of fiscal behavior of incumbent politicians2. Though there is some degree of controversy, 
the literature on political budget cycles is generally consistent in its major findings. 
In developing countries, cycles in fiscal policies and public expenditures are usually of 
higher magnitude and often rewarded by voters (Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya 2004; Guo 
2009; Ehrhart 2011). In developed countries, cycles appear less often, are of a smaller 
magnitude, and may even be punished by voters (Shi and Svensson 2006; Brender and 
Dražen 2008; Streb, Lerna, and Torrens 2009; Klomp and Haan 2013). Often, in devel­
oped countries, politicians prefer to stabilize fiscal policies (Andrikopoulos, Loizides, and 
Prodromidis 2004) or to temporarily change the focus of public expenditures towards 
more visible projects in pre-election years (Brender 2003; Schneider 2009; Aidt, Veiga, 
and Veiga 2011). Examples of manipulation of the composition of expenditures rather 
than levels are also found for developing countries (Dražen and Eslava 2010).
In this paper, we focus on corruption as a phenomenon that can be affected by the 
timing of political cycles. There is no need to emphasize that corruption is undesirable. 
Its effects on various social, economic and political aspects have been well studied in 
academic literature - theoretically, empirically and experimentally, and on both macro 
and micro levels. Corruption has been found to misallocate resources and human cap­
ital, distort income and wealth distribution, decrease levels and quality of investments, 
shift government expenditures towards less transparent directions, increase transaction 
costs, generate wasteful resource expenditures, slow down economic growth, etc. (see, for 
example, Jain (2001) and Rose-Ackerman and Soreide (2011) for comprehensive reviews).
While it is well established that corruption in particular, and the quality and trans­
parency of governance in general, are important determinants of political fiscal cycles 
(Shi and Svensson 2006; Alt and Lassen 2006; Klomp and De Haan 2013; Vergne 2009), 
corruption appears to be subject to cycles itself. Intuitively, the proximity of elections 
may have effects on corrupt behavior similar to its effects on fiscal behavior: if voters 
appreciate a politician’s integrity or his ability to fight corruption, the incumbent may 
want to commit less corruption himself or to stimulate anti-corruption activities prior to 
elections in order to attract extra votes, for the same reasons he adjusts fiscal policies. 
Evidence of such behavior by elected politicians has been found by, for example, Khemani 
(2004) and Vadlamannati (2015) in Indian states, and by Chen (2015) in Chinese mu­
nicipalities. Mironov and Zhuravskaya (2016) highlight another mechanism behind the
2For a comprehensive review of the literature on political budgets cycles see, e.g. De Haan and Klomp 
(2013).
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relationship between political cycles and corruption, providing evidence that politicians 
may engage in more corruption closer to elections to raise funds for their campaigns.
In this paper, we further study the link between political cycles and the corrupt be­
havior of politicians, focusing on the incentives and actions of appointed officials rather 
than of elected officials. Although there are several works on the behavior of appointed 
politicians, the literature on the topic remains scarce. Several recent studies demonstrate 
that appointed politicians behave quite differently than elected officials, being, in general, 
relatively less likely to be involved in opportunistic behavior. For example, Enikolopov 
(2014) shows that appointed politicians are less likely to engage in targeted redistribution 
than their elected counterparts. Specifically, appointed chief executives in US local gov­
ernments are less likely to use excessive public employment as a targeted redistribution 
tool than elected executives. Hessami (2014) demonstrates that elected German mayors 
attract more state grants for highly visible municipal investment projects in pre-election 
years, while in cities with appointed mayors, investment grants do not exhibit any cycle. 
With this paper, we contribute to the discussion on the behavior of appointed politicians 
by studying their corrupt behavior over political cycles.
We investigate the example of Russian regional governors who were appointed by 
the president in the 2005-2012 period. We use a dataset on Russian regions based on 
the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) to estimate the 
effect of the approaching expiration dates of regional governors’ terms on the level of 
corruption anticipated by local firms. To do this, we exploit the variation in the dates of 
surveys and in the length and starting dates of governors’ terms. First, we establish that 
pressure on business for corruption tends to increase toward the end of the incumbent’s 
term3.
We then argue that this pattern could arise due to changes in governors’ private infor­
mation about their career perspectives. Specifically, if a governor becomes more certain 
that he is leaving office once the current term ends, he may have increased incentives to 
engage in corrupt activities in order to accumulate wealth before his departure. Con­
versely, when a governor becomes more certain that he will remain in office for another 
term, he may have incentives to accumulate wealth through corruption more smoothly 
and thus not to increase, or even decrease, his corrupt intensity. As a result, the pattern
3Since our data do not allow us to distinguish between true corruption and reported corruption, which 
may not be identical, the expressions "corruption increases", "firms report higher corruption", "firms 
perceive higher corruption", and "governors put more pressure on business" should be understood as 
equivalent throughout the paper.
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we observe may be generated mostly by the governors who become more certain that they 
will leave office when their current term expires. Although the data we use do not allow 
us to directly verify the existence of the relationship between governors’ beliefs and their 
corrupt behavior, we are able to conduct several exercises to indirectly test the validity 
of this explanation. We show that all of our results are consistent with this explanation, 
while they are not fully consistent with a number of plausible alternatives.
3.2 C o rru p tio n  Cycles in R ussia
There are several theoretical explanations for the existence of politicians’ opportunistic 
behavior driven by political cycles. Early works simply assume that voters are naive: 
they interpret the pre-election performance of an incumbent as a result of his compe­
tency and reward him with votes (Nordhaus 1975). Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and Rogoff 
(1990) suggest a signaling approach to explain fiscal cycles. Their logic is that when 
an incumbent’s competency is not observable by voters, budget cycles could be used by 
politicians to signal their competency. Specifically, a highly competent incumbent in­
creases public expenditures before elections to a higher than optimal level to signal his 
competence, at the expense of debt to be paid after elections. Since such a deviation 
from optimal fiscal strategy is too costly for an incumbent with low competence, voters 
infer high competence from high public expenditures in the pre-election period and thus 
vote for the incumbent. Shi and Svensson (2006) and Martinez (2009) show that asym­
metric information about an incumbent’s competency may generate incentives to finance 
extra government expenditures through excessive borrowing in pre-election periods, even 
if voters do not electorally reward such behavior. In their models, voters cannot infer an 
incumbent’s competency (in fact, productivity) from the amount of public good provided 
(which is determined by both competency and available financial resources: a more com­
petent incumbent could provide more public good given the level of expenditures), and 
thus can only form rational expectations about this. Because of the increasing marginal 
costs of borrowing, an incumbent is likely to have an incentive to excessively borrow prior 
to elections, even though voters would rationally anticipate this.
When politicians are appointed, similar logic can be applied if integrity is valued by 
the society, and if the preferences of the society and of the appointing authority are 
aligned with respect to corruption. If the society and the appointing authority are naive, 
then corruption should decrease prior to re-appointment decisions. The signaling logic
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leads to the same outcome: if the marginal cost of fighting corruption is increasing and 
negatively depends on the incumbent’s competency, a more competent incumbent can 
reduce corruption through an above-optimal level of anti-corruption measures to credibly 
signal his competence because, for a low competent incumbent, such a deviation from 
optimality would be too costly.
In the first part of the paper, we test the hypothesis that corruption decreases close to 
a re-appointment decision using a dataset on Russian regions based on the Business En­
vironment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS). Our results show that pressure 
on business for corruption seems to demonstrate the opposite trend, increasing closer to 
the term expiry date. Specifically, we find that levels of corruption perceived by Rus­
sian firms are relatively stable over the first 75-80% of governors’ terms but then rapidly 
increase in the last 12-18 months.
One might be concerned that this result arises from the nature of the corruption mea­
sure we use rather than from the corrupt behavior of politicians, since the perception of 
corruption may generally fluctuate over a governor’s term for reasons other than actual 
changes in his corrupt behavior. For instance, the perception of corruption may increase 
around the term expiry date as a result of more intense news coverage, media campaigns 
and input from political rivals. Although we cannot completely eliminate these possibil­
ities, we believe that they are unlikely to drive our results. First, the survey question we 
use to construct our main dependent variable is designed to reflect not just managers’ 
perceptions of overall corruption, but their perceptions of obstacles to their present busi­
ness activities as a consequence of corruption, which is less likely to be easily influenced 
by, e.g., the media, without the presence of an actual effect on business, though some 
measurement error is indeed possible. Second, we find the same pattern using an alterna­
tive corruption measure, the share of annual sales paid by firms as bribes, which is much 
less sensitive to information flows that may be generated by the media and political rivals 
around the expiration of a governor’s term. Hence, we believe that the established pattern 
is likely to reflect the pattern in actual corrupt behavior rather than just perceptions.
The established result is consistent with a recent and, to our knowledge, the sole 
existing study on the relationship between corruption and political cycles in Russia, by 
Mironov and Zhuravskaya (2016). Using banking transaction data, they show that the 
amount of illegal cash outflow (measured as transfers to fly-by-night firms) of Russian 
firms that obtain public procurement contracts strongly increases around regional elec­
tions (they consider the 1999-2004 period). This can be explained only by corruption,
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since firms that do not obtain public procurement contracts do not exhibit a similar cycle. 
Neither is such a cycle found in the legal activities of the firms.
Despite being consistent with studies on corruption in Russia, the pattern we find 
does not accord with patterns predicted by standard theories of political budget cycles. 
In the second part of the paper, we try to understand the source of the trend. We discuss 
a number of potential explanations and test their validity in several ways. We show that 
our results are fully consistent with one of our explanations only.
The first step to understanding the pattern is to realize that the Russian political 
system is quite tolerant of corruption in particular and poor performance in publicly 
valued sectors in general. Several studies show that while loyalty is essential for the 
career success of Russian governors, the economic performance of the governed regions 
and governors’ engagement in corruption activities have a weak effect at most. Reuter and 
Robertson (2012), studying an extensive dataset on Russian governors, find that while 
governors’ loyalty to the president and, more specifically, their ability to mobilize votes 
for the ruling party, have a strong impact on appointment decisions, good governance, 
measured as regional economic development, plays a limited role in appointments. This 
finding is confirmed by Reisinger and Moraski (2003), and by Rochlitz (2016). In his 
earlier work, Rochlitz (2014) finds a strong positive relationship between the winning 
margins of the president and the ruling party in a region and the scale of the involvement 
of government officials in illegal corporate raiding (asset-grabbing) in the region, arguing 
that regional officials are allowed to participate in illegal financially rewarding activities 
in exchange for their ability to deliver satisfactory electoral results.
Though it may seem that avoiding corruption closer to re-appointment decisions could 
give a governor stronger support among citizens and thus push the president towards a 
decision in favor of the governor, this does not appear to be an effective strategy in Russia. 
This therefore raises questions as to why governors change their corrupt behavior prior 
to the expiration of their terms and why they engage in increased corruption.
Poor overall governance around re-appointment may serve as a potential explanation. 
Recent research shows that politicians tend to substantially decrease the quality of gov­
ernance close to the end of their terms. If corruption may be thought of as a form of 
misgovernance, this could explain the pattern. Skouras and Christodoulakis (2014) show 
that there is a significant increase in tax evasion and losses from wildfires around elec­
tions in Greece, arguing that this is likely to be a result of increased misgovernance. They 
suggest that officials focus on their campaigns and thus devote less time and resources to
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governance. Secondly, temporal misgovernance, while observed by the majority of voters 
with a lag, may immediately benefit certain interest groups and thus public officials. The 
latter explanation is also supported by Holland (2015), who establishes that in Latin 
American countries with a substantial poor population, politicians strategically tolerate 
violations of the law prior to elections, since law enforcement may negatively affect the 
support of poor voters. Nevertheless, the first explanation cannot be applied in the case 
we study in a straightforward manner. The need to devote time and resources to the 
campaign, whatever that means under the appointment system, should more likely result 
in a decrease in corruption since corrupt activities also require time and resources. The 
second argument could lead to the observed outcome only if corruption rents are par­
tially transferred to the president or higher level government officials who can influence 
the president’s decision to re-appoint a governor; increased corruption around the end of 
a term may arise as a result of the governor’s attempt to increase his chances to remain 
in office. However, the exercises we conduct below show that this is unlikely to be the 
case.
Instead, we suggest that the pattern we observe may be a result of the different
behavior of two different types of governors whose incentives are shaped by the risk
of not being re-appointed, together with private information about their likelihood of
remaining in office. Our hypothesis is that at the beginning of their terms, governors
may not be certain about whether they will remain in office, but throughout the term,
they accumulate some information that changes their beliefs. These changes may be
a result of, for example, information that comes directly from the president and the
president’s circle, or may be driven by news media and rumors, etc. Alternatively, beliefs
may change as a result of changes in the governor’s intention to continue in the position.
It is possible that the accumulation of information forces governors to adjust their corrupt
behavior: if a governor becomes more certain that he will leave office once the current
term has expired, he may have incentives to increase corruption in order to extract rents
which will not be available once he departs. When a governor becomes more certain that
he will keep his office for the next term, he may have higher incentives to smooth rent
extraction over time and thus not increase or may even decrease corruption4. Under the
4Throughout the paper, we mainly discuss corrupt behavior and the incentives of governors, though 
obviously the governor is not the only person in a region who applies corruption pressure on local business. 
In each region there are numerous other local officials who are able to extract rents. Nevertheless, for the 
purpose of our analysis we only need a governor to have a certain amount of control over the actions of 
some other officials and their careers. Given, for example, the usual practice that a governor’s resignation 
results in the consecutive resignation of his core team and affiliated state officials, it is likely that the
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assumption of increasing marginal cost of corrupt activities, such an outcome would be 
the result of a simple inter temporal choice problem where the trade-off is to commit 
more corruption today at a higher marginal cost, or to postpone it for the next term, 
where the cost is lower but where there is also a risk not being re-appointed, and thus 
unable to extract any rent at all. The higher the likelihood of not being re-appointed, 
the more incentives to commit corruption today.
We test this explanation in several ways. Although each of the tests we implement 
has certain shortcomings due to the nature of the data, and hence may be questioned, 
they are all consistent with the explanation but not the other plausible alternatives. 
First, a crucial point about our data is that we observe whether the governors in our 
study remained in office for the next term0. Assuming that governors possessed correct 
information, on average, we perform our analysis separately for firms in regions where 
governors left office and for those in regions where governors stayed for another term. If 
our theory is valid, we should observe increasing corruption over terms in the first case, 
while we should not in the second case. This is exactly the outcome we obtain: those 
governors who are more likely to believe that they are leaving office engage in increasing 
corruption, while those who are more likely to believe that they will remain in office do 
not show an increasing trend.
This result also provides evidence against the alternative potential explanation for 
the established pattern, according to which governors may have incentives to increase 
corruption prior to the end of their term in order to influence the re-appointment decision 
through increased rents transferred to higher level politicians. If this were the case, we 
would obtain the reverse result: the increase in corruption closer to the end of the term 
is observed for those governors who then remained in office, not for those who left.
One may argue that the result, where leaving governors commit increasing corruption 
while staying governors do not, may be driven by an endogeneity problem: if a gover­
nor engages extensively in corrupt activities, he is more likely not to be re-appointed. 
However, we believe this is unlikely to be a driving force of the patterns found. First, as 
discussed above, corrupt behavior is unlikely to have a substantial effect on the likelihood 
of being re-appointed under the Russian political system. Second, when the corruption 
of a regional politician becomes an issue for the president, there are relatively simple
approach of expiration of a governor’s term generates incentives for corruption for some local officials 
similar to those of the governor himself.
5One of the governors considered in our study has not yet finished his term.
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tools for removing him before his term ends. There have been several historical cases 
when a governor was dismissed and then arrested following accusations of corruption6. 
Third, while the explanation that the president is reluctant to re-appoint governors who 
increasingly engage in corruption is plausible, the behavior of governors who were not 
re-appointed can hardly be rationalized: they must anticipate the president’s reaction to 
their actions, and thus increasing corruption cannot be an equilibrium behavior under 
reasonable assumptions. Fourth, we conduct a set of additional tests and obtain results 
which, while consistent with our primary explanation, are not consistent with the story 
that the president punishes corrupt governors.
We use information on personal meetings between regional governors and the Russian 
president in the last year or two of their terms as a proxy for a change in governors’ 
beliefs. The president occasionally meets governors in different formats: during his visits 
to regions, at various summits, conferences and other events, and in one-on-one meetings 
in the Kremlin, his residence and workplace. We assume that if a one-on-one meeting 
takes place some time close to the expiration of the governor’s term, it substantially 
changes or even resolves the governor’s uncertainty about his likelihood of remaining in 
office for another term. During such a meeting, the president is likely to fully disclose, 
or strongly signal, his intentions regarding re-appointment of the governor. Likewise, if 
the governor decides to retire at the end of his term or to continue to govern, he is likely 
to let the president know this during the meeting and is unlikely to reverse the decision 
after the meeting7. If this is the case, and if our theory is valid, one should observe that 
a) those governors who left office at the end of their term put more pressure on business 
after a meeting with the president than before, and b) those governors who stayed for 
another term should decrease corruption or, at least, not increase it after a meeting. In 
the final section of this paper we demonstrate that this is precisely the case.
6For example, the governor of the Tula region, Vyacheslav Dudka, was removed from office by the 
president in July 2011, just 15 months after his re-appointment, arrested and then convicted of and jailed 
for corruption. In 2015 the governor of the Sakhalin region, Alexander Khoroshavin, and the governor 
of the Komi region, Vyacheslav Gayzer, were arrested and removed from office following accusations of 
severe corruption. In June 2016, the same happened to the governor of the Kirov region, Nikita Belykh.
7An example of a meeting in which a governor asked the president not to consider 
him for re-appointment: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/6697. An example of
a meeting in which the president suggested a governor should leave office and take an­
other position: http://en.kremlin.ru/catalog/persons/215/events/11769. An example of a meet­
ing in which the president informed a governor that he had decided to re-appoint him: 
http://kremlin.ru/catalog/persons/214/events/6172 (in Russian).
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3.3 E m pirical A nalysis
3.3.1 B ackground
In 1993, when the current Constitution of Russia was adopted, there were 89 constituent 
entities ("federal subjects") in the country "which shall have equal rights" according 
to Article 5 of the Constitution. Between 2003 and 2007, several mergers took place, 
and since then there have been 83 federal subjects in Russia, including 21 "republics", 
9 "krays", 46 "oblasts", 2 "cities of federal significance", 1 "autonomous oblast" and 4 
"autonomous okrugs". For simplicity, we refer to all of these as "regions". Since Russia 
became an independent state following the collapse of the Soviet Union, mechanisms for 
selecting regional governors ("gubernators") have been very mixed across regions: in some 
regions governors were elected directly by the population, in others they were appointed 
by regional parliaments or by the Russian president. Since 1996, following the decision of 
the Constitutional Court of Russia, governors of all the federal subjects had to be directly 
elected by the regional population.
At the end of 2004, the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, proposed a reform that 
abolished direct gubernatorial elections in order to consolidate the federal state: from that 
time until 2012 regional governors were appointed by the president. Although formally the 
new procedure assumed that the president would only nominate a candidate for governor, 
and the regional parliament would then approve or reject the candidate, there was no 
single case when the parliament of a region did not approve a presidential nominee. The 
reform was approved by the Parliament of Russia ("State Duma") in December 2004. 
Because the reform assumed the replacement of elected governors after the expiration 
of their terms, and the date of expiration varied significantly across the regions, the full 
replacement of elected governors took about five years. The first appointed governor took 
office in February 2005, while the term of the last elected governor expired in December 
2009, and from then all the governors were appointed until October 2012. The variation 
in the dates of gubernatorial appointments across the regions can be mostly explained 
by differences in local legislation that allowed for different term lengths (usually four 
or five years) as well as a high degree of freedom for regions in setting the dates of 
gubernatorial elections in the past. Because of this, we believe that the variation in the 
dates of governors’ appointments, and thus in the dates of the expiration of their terms 
across regions, can be considered exogenous.
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3.3.2 D ata
We use data on Russian firms from two waves of the EBRD/World Bank Business En­
vironment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) conducted in 2008-2009 (wave 
IV) and 2011-2012 (wave V)8. Together the waves provide data on about 5,000 firms in 
37 Russian regions (about 1,100 firms from 20 regions in the first wave and over 3,800 
firms from 37 regions in the second wave). According to the description of the BEEPS 
dataset, the authors of the survey did their best to ensure that the sample of firms is 
representative, with a stratified survey design of three levels: industries, firm size, and 
(most importantly for our analysis) regions.
Our main variable comes from the Likert scale question "Is corruption an obstacle 
to the current operations?", the answers to which range from "no obstacle" (0) to "very 
severe obstacle" (4). We label the main variable Corrupt. We also use an alternative 
indicator of corruption which BEEPS offers: answers to the questions "On average, what 
percent of total annual sales, or estimated total annual value, do establishments like this 
one pay in informal payments or gifts to public officials to "get things done" (see Fig­
ure 3.7 in the Appendix for the precise survey form). We label this variable as Cor Sale. 
Although this variable may seem to better reflect actual corruption and be more ap­
propriate for the purposes of our analysis due to its continuous nature, we should treat 
answers to this question with care. In our dataset, only 67.0% of respondents (3319 
observations) answered the question at all, and only 15.1% of those (501 observations) 
reported having made such payments. One reason may be that they are reluctant to 
discuss their involvement in corrupt activity. In contrast, 61.4% of respondents (3041 
observations) reported that corruption is an obstacle to current operations (from minor 
to very severe). Another possible problem with Cor Sale is that answers to this question 
depend heavily on the knowledge of the individuals surveyed, and thus may be subject 
to severe measurement error. Moreover, this measure does not account for any form of 
corruption not directly related to informal payments, while our main corruption measure 
does. Thus, throughout our analysis, we use the categorical variable Corrupt as the main 
measure of perceived corruption, and as a robustness check, present some results using 
CorSale as an alternative measure, showing that our main findings are quite similar for 
both measures.
From BEEPS, we take various firms’ characteristics such as industry, owner’s origin,
8Three earlier waves of the survey do not contain information on regions where the surveyed firms 
operate, and thus cannot be used for our analysis.
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number of employees, age, manager’s gender, etc. We also collect data on the character­
istics of governors of the regions such as origin and length of tenure in office. Given some 
evidence that the perception of corruption in Russian regions may depend on regional 
economic development and bureaucratization (Dininio and Orttung 2005; Sharafutdinova 
2010), we complete our dataset with the political and economic characteristics of the re­
gions where the firms operate, including gross regional product per capita, population, 
unemployment rate, number of state officials, etc. Please see Tables 3.6-3.10 for the 
complete list of variables used in our analysis.
Wave IV of the BEEPS survey design uses three aggregate industry categories for 
stratification, which consist of the highest aggregation-level groups (one-digit codes) of 
ISIC9. In wave V, a more detailed industry classification (two-digit codes) is used for 
stratification. To avoid potential issues due to the difference in the levels of aggregation, 
we use the highest level of ISIC classification. Our final dataset contains data on 4953 
firms operated between 2008 and 2012 in 37 Russian regions across 7 industry groups.
3.3.3 Baseline M odel: Identification
We want to test the hypothesis that the approach of the expected expiration date of the 
term of office influences the corrupt behavior of governors. For this purpose, we estimate 
the following model:
Corruptir = ct0 + a-^Timeir + a2Timelr + azControlsir + uir (3.1)
where Timeir is the share of the current term of a governor of region r where firm i 
operates, completed by the date when the firm was surveyed. For instance, if firm i 
from region r was surveyed on the day when the regional governor began serving his 
current term, Timeir = 0; if the firm was surveyed on the last day of the governor’s term, 
Timeir = 1; if at the moment of the survey the governor had served 3 years of his 5 
year term, Timeir = 0.6. We use percentages to measure time passed from the beginning 
of the current governor’s term until the time of the survey instead of days, weeks or 
months because of the variation in term length across Russian regions; in some regions 
term length is 4 years, while in others it is 510. Using percentages allows us to make our
international Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities, Revision 3.1 
(http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regcst.asp7Cl 17)
10We also performed our analysis for the case when Tim e  is measured as the raw number of months 
remaining in a governor’s term, as well as separately for regions with 4-year terms and 5-year terms.
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variable of interest comparable across regions. Time?r is a quadratic term for Timeir; 
Controls,.,. are other control variables for a region’s, governor’s and firm’s characteristics 
and year dummies; Uj,r is the error term.
We try to determine whether corruption levels follow any pattern over governors’ 
terms. Our main variable of interest is Timeir. Variation in Timeir comes from several 
sources. First, as discussed above, the dates of governors’ term expirations across Russian 
regions vary for historical reasons and due to differences in regional electoral legislation. 
Second, dates of the survey in each wave vary substantially both across regions and, 
within a region, across firms11. For example, for 16 of 37 regions in our dataset there are 
observations for each of the 4 survey years (2008, 2009, 2011 and 2012). The dates on 
which firms within regions and waves were surveyed vary on average by 7 months. The 
kernel density of Time,,. is presented in the Appendix, Figure 3.6. Given the sources, the 
variation in Timeir can be considered exogenous to the dependent variable, allowing for 
identification of the effect of interest. Since we expect that the effect may be non-linear, 
we include a quadratic term for Time,,.. Further, to verify the robustness of the timing 
effect, we split governors’ terms into 10 equally spaced time periods and directly control 
for them with dummy variables instead of using Timeir.
Unfortunately, BEEPS data for Russia contains only 128 firms that are present in 
both wave IV and wave V. This does not allow us to construct true panel data, so we 
are limited to cross-section estimation methods with regional fixed effects and dummy 
variables for the years the survey was conducted, and a mean-based pseudo-panel where 
we can group data by regions, since we observe firms from the same regions in different 
years. First, we estimate the model (3.1) on pooled cross-sectional data, with Corrupt 
as the dependent variable, using several methods. We run an ordinary least squares 
regression and a logistic regression with a binary variable which takes 0 value in the case 
of no or minor corruption perceived by firms and 1 otherwise. Since the Logit equation 
ignores additional information on the intensity of corruption, we use an ordered logistic 
regression. Because this assumes that coefficients are the same for different categories 
and error variances are homoskedastic, while we suspect that these assumptions may be 
violated, we also estimate a generalized ordered logit (GOLogit) model, which relaxes
The results are very similar to those presented in this paper. These results, as well as all the results 
mentioned but not presented throughout this paper, are available from the authors upon request.
u We are indeed not the first to exploit the variation in the timing of a survey for identification. 
See Eifert, Miguel, and Posner (2010) for an example of the use of such a variation to study political 
processes.
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the proportional odds assumption. Since error terms for firms are likely to be correlated 
within regions, in all the estimations we use the corresponding clustering.
Next, we try to partially overcome the identification problems implied by the cross- 
sectional nature of the data, by constructing a group-mean pseudo-panel for our dataset. 
The idea of group-mean pseudo-panels, originally suggested by Deaton (1985), is to iden­
tify groups in the data and then to follow group means over time. As the BEEPS survey 
follows a stratified design with respect to regions, we can use regions as such groups 
to construct a group-mean pseudo-panel. Although there are certain issues with using 
pseudo-panels, such as biased estimates and measurement errors under certain circum­
stances, they generally make it possible to obtain consistent estimates when individual 
effects are correlated with explanatory variables, as with genuine panel data (see Collado 
1997; McKenzie 2004, and Verbeek 2008 for a discussion on the consistency of pseudo­
panel estimates).
Following (Verbeek 2008), the basic pseudo-panel model with repeated observations 
over T  periods and R  groups (regions) in our case is as follows:
-----------------  -----------  ----------- 2 -------------------/Corrupt^ t = Timerjfi-i + Timert^2 + Controlsrt/33 + ayjt + řžr;í, (3.2)
where r  =  1 , 7 2 ;  f =  1 , T; Corrupt^ - is the average value of all observed Corrupt^s 
in group r in period t, and similarly for other variables.
If we treat the group-specific effects ar>t as fixed unknown parameters and assume 
that there is no variation over time, that is ay;i = ar (ar,t —> ar if nr —> oo), we can 
estimate the above model by fixed effect estimator. We construct two panels, using survey 
waves (2 periods) and survey years (4 periods) as the time units. Since in both panels we 
have fewer than 100 observations per group on average, we may encounter a small-sample 
bias problem. Though there is no general rule to judge whether nr is large enough to use 
asymptotics, and researchers often work with 100-200 observations per group, some works 
(e.g. Devereux (2007)) suggest that a group size of this magnitude might not be sufficient 
to achieve unbiased estimates. Furthermore, identification in the pseudo-panels comes 
from variation across 107 region-years and 57 region-waves, a relatively small number of 
groups, which might also result in biased estimates. As a result, we treat the pseudo­
panel approach as an additional robustness check rather than as the main test of our 
hypothesis.
To further explore the effect of timing on corruption, we use CorSale as a dependent
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variable and estimate a two-part model (a generalized version of a Tobit model), which 
assumes that zero and positive outcomes are generated by different underlying decisions, 
since this is likely to be the case with the Cor Sale corruption measure. In the two part 
model, a decision to participate in corruption activities is modeled by Logit, while the 
intensity of corruption is modeled by a generalized linear model. We estimate the model 
for CorSale using both a continuous variable Time and time dummies.
3.4 B aseline M odel: R esu lts
The main results for Corrupt are presented in Table 3.1 in the Appendix, columns 1-4. 
The regressions for Table 3.1 provide similar results in terms of the significance and the 
direction of the effect, although the interpretation is somewhat different. Standard errors 
are clustered on regions. We use an OLS estimation (column 1, Table 3.1) for illustrative 
purposes only, since there are obviously several difficulties with the OLS estimation in 
our case. First, errors are likely to be heteroskedastic and not normally distributed. 
Second, the results of the OLS estimation would correspond to ordered models when the 
thresholds are about the same distance apart, while this may not be true in our case, and 
thus OLS can give misleading results (Long 1997).
Logit (we combining categories "no obstacles" and "minor obstacle" into value 0,
and the other categories into 1) and an ordered logistic regression provide similar results
for Timeir and Time?, in terms of log odds (columns 2-3 of Table 3.1). We test the
parallel odds assumption for ordered logistic regression using a Wald test. The statistics
for Timeir and Time?r are not significant at the 5% level (see Table 3.11, column 1),
implying that we do not find strong evidence that the parallel odds assumption is violated
for these variables. However, the overall Wald test statistic is significant, suggesting that
this assumption may be violated for the model in general. To account for this problem,
we use a generalized ordered Logit model (GOLogit)12 which relaxes the parallel odds
assumption for variables for which it is violated. The main results of the GOLogit (column
4 of Table 3.1) do not substantially differ from the results for the ordered logistic regression
in terms of direction, magnitude and significance of the effects13.
12We use an add-on module in Stata, go logit2 , written by Richard, W. (2006) Generalized Ordered 
Logit/ Partial Proportional Odds Models for Ordinal Dependent Variables. The Stata Journal 6(1): 
58-82.
13If the Wald test statistic is significant at the 10% level for an explanatory variable, the GOLogit 
model generates more than one distinct coefficient for the variable. For a more efficient presentation, we 
do not report the coefficient for such variables, labeling them "vary".
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Time (term completion share) -1.560** (0.712) -1.775* (1.034) -2.026** (0.958) -2.010** (0.916)
Time (term completion share)2 1.827*** (0.671) 1.912** (0.910) 2.409*** (0.917) 2.372*** (0.861)
Foreign ownership -0.002 (0.002) -0.003 (0.003) -0.002 (0.002) -0.002 (0.002)
Female manager -0.149** (0.064) -0.231*** (0.084) -0.204** (0.090) -0.206** (0.091)
in (Employment) 0.012 (0.018) 0.034 (0.028) 0.023 (0.023) vary
ln(Firm’s age) 0.085** (0.035) 0.117** (0.053) 0.104** (0.044) 0.105** (0.044)
Private 0.227*** (0.077) 0.400*** (0.106) 0.281*** (0.103) vary
Permit 0.286*** (0.054) 0.392*** (0.072) 0.348*** (0.070) vary
1st term 0.418** (0.189) 0.650** (0.263) 0.556** (0.258) 0.570** (0.248)
Governor’s origin (local) 0.307** (0.151) 0.592** (0.232) 0.365* (0.198) 0.456** (0.191)
Unemployment -0.125 (0.081) -0.129 (0.118) -0.161 (0.103) vary
ln(State officials per 1000) -3.282*** (1.168) -5.391** (2.339) -4.046*** (1.508) -4.726*** (1.558)
ln(Real GRP per capita) 0.033 (0.598) -0.281 (1.135) 0.027 (0.733) vary
Last, elections (UR’s share) -0.022 (0.017) -0.035 (0.026) -0.026 (0.022) -0.031 (0.021)
Last, elections (Turnout,) 0.033* (0.018) 0.053** (0.025) 0.043* (0.023) 0.047** (0.022)
Gity size -0.067 (0.055) -0.111 (0.087) -0.098 (0.072) -0.096 (0.074)
Year 2009 0.456* (0.264) 0.409 (0.373) 0.623* (0.332) vary
Year 2011 -0.953** (0.461) -1.182* (0.710) -1.157* (0.607) vary
Year 2012 -1.200** (0.539) -1.355* (0.808) -1.462** (0.723) vary
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters (Regions) 37 37 37 37
Pseudo R? 0.0728 0.043 0.060
McFadden adj. R2 0.033 0.066 0.039 0.055
A1G 17333 6410 14383 14144
BIG 17496 6573 14578 14391
Observations 4953 4953 4953 4953
Standard errors clustered on Regions are reported in parentheses
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the EBRD and World Bank BEEl’S survey 















Term completion share (Expected)
(b) Minor obstacle
Term completion share (Expected)
(c) Moderate obstacle
Term completion share (Expected)
Term completion share (Expected)
(e) Very severe obstacle
Term completion share (Expected)
(f) Ln(CorSale)
Term completion share (Expected)
Figure 3.1: Predicted probabilities of Corrupt outcomes after OLogit (charts a-e) and combined expected value of Cor Sale after 
TPM (chart f) by Time.
Overall, our results show that the stage of the governor’s term and perception of 
corruption by local business are strongly related in a non-linear way. The effect of the term 
completion share (Timeir) and its quadratic term Time2r are statistically significant at the 
5% and the 1% level, respectively. To illustrate the dynamics of corruption perception 
over a governor’s term, we construct, based on our estimates from the OLogit model, 
predicted probabilities to observe each value of the variable Corrupt as a function of 
Time. The probabilities are presented in Figure 3.1.
Further, we use jackknife re-sampling to estimate standard errors for our ordered 
logistic regression non-parametrically. It is an important exercise in our case: if the 
results from asymptotic and non-parametric methods differ, this might indicate serious 
data problems such as the presence of outliers and extremely skewed data distribution. 
We find that our jackknife standard errors are in line with those produced by the ordered 
Logit, which implies no evidence of severe issues with data. We also estimate our model 
using two-way cluster-robust standard errors on regions and years, regions and industries, 
and year and industries, suspecting that error terms for firms may be correlated within 
a year, a region and an industry. The results of such analysis do not significantly differ 
from the previous results.
The predicted probability of perception of the low corruption levels ("no obstacle" 
and "minor obstacle" to current operations) demonstrates an inverse U-shaped profile, 
while the pattern for perception of higher levels of corruption ("major" and "very severe" 
obstacle to current operations) is exactly the opposite. The graphs suggest that firms 
on average perceive higher pressure for corruption at the beginning and at the end of 
the political cycle. In quantitative terms, the predicted probability of perception of zero- 
corruption ("no obstacle") increases, on average, from approximately 0.3 to 0.42 during 
the first half of the term and then decreases below the initial value during the second half 
of the term, while the probability of high corruption ("very severe") falls, on average, 
from approximately 0.15 to 0.1 and then rises to 0.2 closer to the end of the term. That 
is, corruption moderately decreases during the first half of the term and then increases 
during the second half relatively quickly.
To check the robustness of the timing effect, we combine the values of Time into 10 
equally spaced groups and create 10 corresponding dummy variables. A dummy Time-i 
(i G [0,9]) equals 1 for an observation if the term completion share for the observation is 
between i/10 and (i + l)/10. The results of the estimation with time dummies instead 















(a) No obstacle (b) Minor obstacle (c) Moderate obstacle
Term completion share (Expected) Term completion share (Expected) Term completion share (Expected)
Term completion share (Expected) Term completion share (Expected) Term completion share (Expected)
Figure 3.2: Predicted probabilities of Corrupt outcomes after OLogit (charts a-e) and combined expected value of CorSale after 
TPM (chart f) by Time dummies.
The graphs show that corruption slowly decreases from the beginning towards the 
middle of the term with an accelerated drop around 50%-60% of the term, followed 
by a rapid increase in the last 20%-30% of the term. Indeed, the fast decrease during 
the period around the middle of the term could be a result of certain features of the 
data rather than a systematic pattern in the behavior of governors. If this is the case, 
then the established U-shaped pattern can to some extent come from this data anomaly. 
Nevertheless, the severe increase in corruption in the last quarter of a term is observed 
in both the continuous and the dummy specifications.
As a further robustness check, we estimate the effect of term completion on corruption 
based on pseudo-panel data. As we discussed above, our data do not allow us to perform 
the usual panel data analysis, since there are very few firms that we observe in more than 
one wave of the survey. However, since we observe firms operating in the same regions 
in two waves of the survey, we can construct group-mean pseudo-panels, using regions 
as groups, and analyze the resulting data set with the usual panel data techniques. The 
results of fixed-effects are presented in Table 3.2. Although they are consistent with 
previous results, one needs to keep in mind that, as discussed in the previous section, the 
estimates could be biased due to the relatively small data sample. The linear prediction 
of corruption by different values of Time after fixed effects regression for 2 (waves) and 4 
time periods (years) are presented in Figure 3.3. The dynamics are fully in line with our 
previous results for continuous variable Time: pressure for corruption follows a U-shaped 
trend.
Figure 3.3: Linear predictions of region-average corruption levels after FE regressions.
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For the alternative measure of corruption, the share of sales a firm pays as bribes, 
labeled CorSale, we identify a similar pattern. The results of the estimations are pre­
sented in Table 3.1, columns 5-7. It is important to point out that the distribution of 
CorSale is far from normal because of the presence of excessive zeroes. This skewness 
can possibly cause severe problems with the OLS estimation (column 5 of Table 3.1), thus 
we prefer to focus on a two-part model (TPM) (columns 6-7). TPM combines logistic 
regression (Logit, column 6), where all the values of the dependent variable are grouped 
into zeros and positive values, and a generalized linear model(GLM, column 7), which 
deals with positive values. The Logit results for Timeir are in line with the main results 
for the dependent variable Corrupt in terms of the direction of effects, although the mag­
nitudes differ slightly. The two-part model estimates demonstrate that the results for the 
CorSale come mainly from participation in corruption (Logit), but not from corruption 
intensity (GLM).
This may be because CorSale variable is noisy, and its true value heavily depends 
on the truthfulness of respondents, among other concerns. To illustrate the dynamics of 
corruption, measured as the share of sales firms pay as bribes, we construct a graph of 
the combined expected value of the corruption measure as a function of term completion 
share (Time). The corresponding chart is presented in Figure 3.1. Finally, as in the 
case of Corrupt, we use time dummies to further explore the timing effect on CorSale. 
The results of the estimation are illustrated in Figure 3.2. Overall, all the findings are 
consistent: perceived corruption substantially grows towards the end of governors’ terms.
There are several other variables, in addition to the variable of interest, which also have 
a significant effect on corruption perception. First, firms that were originally established 
as private (dummy variable Private), and older firms tend to report higher corruption 
than those established as state-owned firms, joint ventures with foreign partners and 
firms established after privatization of state-owned companies. Perceived corruption is 
also substantially higher for firms with recent experience of dealing with a permit-issuing 
state bureau (specifically, dummy variable Permit equals 1 if a firm submitted an appli­
cation to obtain a construction-related permit over the two years prior to the interview). 
Coefficients on the dummy for a top manager being a woman (Female) are mostly sig­
nificantly negative across specifications, suggesting that firms under female management 
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Foreign ownership -0.083*** (0.019) -0.023 (0.016) -0.001 (0.001) 0.002 (0.005) -0.006*** (0.001)
Female manager -1.176*** (0.310) -0.796 (0.800) -0.049* (0.028) -0.283 (0.176) -0.098 (0.105)
In (Employment) 0.145** (0.055) 0.124 (0.091) -0.006 (0.011) 0.052 (0.057) -0.112*** (0.036)
ln(Firm’s age) 0.759*** (0.175) 0.110 (0.282) 0.015 (0.019) 0.063 (0.103) 0.055 (0.055)
Private 0.941*** (0.281) 0.440 (0.627) 0.035 (0.043) 0.252 (0.224) -0.047 (0.124)
Permit -0.154 (0.269) -0.095 (0.578) 0.098** (0.047) 0.426** (0.174) 0.075 (0.086)
1st term -0.091 (0.062) 0.258 (0.235) 0.545*** (0.157) 1.601*** (0.592) 0.049 (0.173)
Governor’s origin (local) -0.150 (0.118) 0.357 (0.226) 0.339** (0.131) 1.766*** (0.473) -0.001 (0.214)
Unemployment 0.003 (0.040) -0.081 (0.119) -0.087 (0.085) -0.623* (0.334) -0.085 (0.128)
ln(State officials per 1000) -0.016 (0.416) -1.947 (1.658) -2.624** (1.250) -14.459** (5.695) -0.738 (1.196)
ln(Real GRP per capita) -1.381*** (0.375) -0.141 (0.616) -0.027 (0.670) 1.811 (3.062) -0.338 (1.039)
Last, elections (UR’s share) -0.007 (0.013) -0.037* (0.018) -0.011 (0.021) -0.031 (0.071) 0.024 (0.015)
Last, elections (Turnout,) 0.025** (0.010) 0.045** (0.022) 0.028 (0.020) 0.142** (0.068) -0.016 (0.021)
City size -0.327*** (0.089) -0.210 (0.229) -0.054 (0.033) -0.219 (0.176) -0.117 (0.130)
Year 2009 0.428 (0.384) -0.540 (0.338) -3.912*** (1.438) 0.329 (0.348)
Year 2011 -1.105** (0.526) -1.559*** (0.507) -8.826*** (2.308) 0.980 (0.670)
Year 2012 0.070 (0.273) -1.218* (0.606) -1.722*** (0.528) -10.106*** (2.592) 0.993 (0.807)
Region fixed effects Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes
Clusters 37 37 37 37
Overall R2 0.1334 0.2978
Pseudo R2 0.264
McFadden adj. R2 0.086
A1C -209 88 6723 3295
BIG -172 139 6875 3600
Observations 57 107 3319 3319
Standard errors Robust, Robust, Clustered: Region Clustered: Region
Standard errors in parentheses
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the EBRD and World Bank BEEl’S survey 
* p < 0.10, ** p <  0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 3.3: Wald test for the parallel odds assumption (p-values associated with the statistic).
Overall W ald y2
(1)
Full sam ple
y 2(36) =  458.29***
(2)
R etired
y 2(14) =  10.17
(3)
R e-appointed
y 2(22) =  11.68
(4)
M iLeningrad obi.
y 2( l l )  -  6.78
(5)
M:Moscow city
X2(9) =  6.67
(6)
M :R etired ly
1 year
y 2(13) =  6.69
(7)
M :R etired 2y
2 years
y 2(13) =  10.35
(8)
M :R e-appointed 2y 
2 years
y 2(16) =  12.68
T im e (term  com pletion share) 0.1667 0.2990 0.9988
Tim e (term  com pletion share)2 0.1414 0.9594 0.5304
M eeting president 0.0727 0.0065 0.8390 0.0008 0.0853
Foreign ownership 0.5124 0.3231 0.5408 0.8319 0.2662 0.7897 0.3704 0.2598
Fem ale m anager 0.3488 0.6974 0.5168 0.7585 0.1626 0.8001 0.5311 0.8897
in (Em ploym ent) 0.0011 0.1006 0.4354 0.1233 0.1906 0.0236 0.0077 0.0899
ln (F irm ’s age) 0.1290 0.0877 0.4160 0.0980 0.9403 0.8229 0.6883 0.9529
Private 0.0001 0.0252 0.8018 0.3373 0.1493 0.0827 0.0060 0.1546
P erm it 0.0063 0.0096 0.4903 0.7021 0.9333 0.5361 0.2020 0.1348
N o n -ls t term 0.0839 0.0026 0.9482 0.0039 0.0059 0.0042
G overnor’s origin (local) 0.2058 0.0011 0.0008 0.0028 0.0002
Unem ploym ent >0.0001 0.8196 0.9887 0.8533 0.0810 0.4033
ln (S ta te  officials per 1000) 0.4004 0.0016 0.0237 0.0072 0.0009 0.0024
ln(R eal G R P per capita) >0.0001 0.5381 0.3148 0.0115 0.0028 0.8905
Gity size 0.8013 0.0984 0.7194 0.0062 0.3578 0.9058
Last, elections (U R ’s share) 0.9440 0.0017 0.0246 0.0054 0.6817 0.0301
Last, elect,inos (turnout,) 0.8740 0.0007 0.0209 0.0051 0.0013 0.0052
Year — 2009 >0.0001 0.0173 0.3244 0.3078 0.0046 0.9760 0.5502 0.1075
Year — 2011 0.0001 0.0010 0.0297 0.9 901 0.0050 0.6333 0.0292
Year =  2012 0.0010 0.0011 0.0200 0.8843 0.0051 0.0124 0.0320
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
In d u stry  fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Further, firms tend to experience higher corruption in regions where governors have 
had a career associated with the region, in contrast to those who came from other regions, 
and where governors serve their first terms, as well as in regions with a lower relative 
number of state officials. The last finding could be a result of either lower rents due 
to higher competition among officials or the fact that the regions with high numbers of 
state officials are typically remote regions with low population density located in the north 
and far east of Russia, where business activity is generally low and, as a consequence, 
corruption is relatively moderate.
Finally, in the majority of the specifications, the dummies for 2011 and 2012 have a 
strong negative impact on dependent variables. This may indicate either a general trend 
of decreasing corruption in Russia between 2009 and 2012 or a growing tolerance for cor­
ruption over time. We tend to believe the former, since there was a notable liberalization 
of the business environment in Russia following the 2008-2009 crisis (Yakovlev 2014) that 
might have affected corruption.
3.4.1 R etired  vs. R e-A p p oin ted  G overnors
Having estimated the baseline model, we observe that firms tend to experience more 
obstacles to their operations closer to the end of terms of local governors. As we argue 
above, this pattern cannot be explained by the reasoning behind the standard political 
budget cycles theories. Instead, we suggest not focusing on the established pattern, but 
decomposing it, since it is based on an aggregation of the behavior of two very different 
groups of governors whose incentives for corruption may be completely different. Our 
theory is that governors accumulate some information regarding their future over terms: 
early in his term, a governor may be unsure whether he will stay in office for another 
term; he becomes more certain towards the end of the term. This changing uncertainty 
shapes governors’ corruption incentives: the more a governor is certain that he is leaving, 
the higher his incentives to commit corruption. Our data allow us to test this theory in 
several ways. In this and the next section, we present the results of these tests.
First, since we know what eventually happened to the majority of governors in our 
sample, we perform our analysis separately for firms in regions where governors left once 
their current term had expired, and for firms in regions where governors stayed for another 
term. Our theory suggests that in regions where governors left, firms should experience 
increasing corruption over the term, while in regions where governors stayed, corruption
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should follow a decreasing, or at least a non-increasing trend.
We divide governors from our data sample into two groups. We label a governor
Retired if he is not re-appointed once his current term is over. We label a governor 
Re-appointed if he is re-appointed for another term once the current term is over, or if he 
requested the president’s approval before his term is expired and was then re-appointed.14






T im e (term  com pletion share)
T im e (term  com pletion share)2
9.294**







Foreign ownership -0.006** (0.003) -0 .0 0 5 (0.003)
Fem ale m anager -0 .257* (0.133) -0 .0 2 2 (0.136)
ln(Em ploym ent) 0.029 (0.051) 0.013 (0.048)
ln (F irm ’s age) 0.024 (0.089) 0.104 (0.086)
Private 0.335* (0.176) 0.277 (0.178)
P erm it 0.536*** (0.174) 0.459*** (0.167)
1st term 4.940*** (1.862) 3.630 (3.258)
G overnor’s origin (local) 2.163 (2.660) -0 .1 8 7 (1.523)
U nemploy m ent 0.345 (0.379) 0.754** (0.369)
ln (S ta te  officials per 1000) 0.539 (6.687) -11.308* (6.574)
ln(R eal G R P per capita) 1.231 (2.070) -3 .1 1 0 (2.351)
Last, elections (U R ’s share) -0.288*** (0.106) -0 .477* (0.263)
Last, elections (Turnout) 0.212** (0.097) 0.595** (0.295)
Gity size 0.057 (0.124) -0 .1 6 2 (0.133)
Year 2009 -1 .2 7 2 (0.992) 0.038 (0.837)
Year 2011 -9.234*** (2.889) -2 .2 2 6 (4.039)
Year 2012 -9.160*** (2.879) -1 .4 8 7 (4.364)
Region fixed effects Yes Yes
Industry  fixed effects Yes Yes
M cFadden’s adj. //- 0.039 0.035
Pseudo R 2 0.063 0.062
A1G 2887 2720
BIG 3076 2911
O bservations 1386 1304
Robust, s tan d ard  errors in parentheses.
A u th o rs’ calculations based on the EBRD and W orld B ank B E E l’S survey. 
Baseline: Year - 2008 
* p  <  0.10, ** p  <  0.05, *** p  < 0.01
We have to exclude observations for a number of governors, including several who 
voluntarily resigned, since we do not know how far in advance the resignation decisions 
were made, and governors requested the president’s approval far in advance of their 
term expiry dates. We also removed several governors who were promoted once their 
terms expired to positions such as ministers, since their incentives for corruption while 
serving as governors may have been mixed. On the one hand, if a governor expects to 
be promoted, he knows that he will still be in the system in the future and will have
14 After the abolition of direct gubernatorial elections, governors of several regions asked for the "pres­
ident’s trust": effectively they voluntarily resigned long before the expiration of their current terms, 
immediately asked for re-appointment for another term, received it, and thus received another four or 
five years in office.
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continuing opportunities to extract rents, so there is no need for him to increase pressure 
for corruption to "smooth consumption". On the other hand, knowing that he will not 
be in the region for the next term may give a governor incentives to extract as much 
as possible from the region before relocating. We do not have sufficient observations to 
create a separate group for the promoted governors. Overall, our dataset includes 1386 
observations for 12 Retired and 1304 observations for 14 Re-appointed governors. As 
we now deal with a smaller sample size, we group the five Corrupt categories into the 
following three: "no obstacle", "minor and moderate obstacle", "major and very severe 
obstacle". Moreover, as we now know the actual expiry dates of the governors’ terms, 
we can compute Time as an actual term completion share. Kernel densities of Time for 
Retired and Re-appointed governors, available in the data, are presented in Figure 3.6 in 
the Appendix.
Retired
(b) Minor/Moderate obstacle (c) Major/V.severe obstacle
Term completion
Re-appointed
(e) Minor/Moderate obstacle (f) Major/V.severe obstacle
Figure 3.4: Predicted probabilities of corruption levels by Time for Retired and Re­
appointed governors.
Since, according to the Wald test, there is no evidence that the parallel odds assump­
tion is violated either for retired or re-appointed governors (See Table 3.11, columns 2-3), 
we use ordered logit for the estimation. The results of the estimation for the Corrupt 
dependent variable are presented in Table 3.4. From the graphs of predicted probabilities 
for the values of Corrupt (Figure 3.4), it is clear that for the retired governors, pressure
86
for corruption increases over time, while for the re-appointed it is relatively stable for the 
first half of the term, but then notably falls towards the end. These results fully meet 
our expectations: if a governor is likely to leave office once his current term is expired he 
has increasing incentives to engage in corrupt activities, while when he expects to remain 
in office for another term the incentives decrease.
As in the case of the baseline model, we check the robustness of the timing effect 
using dummies for the groups of time periods instead of the continuous variable Time. 
The results of the estimation are in line with those for the case of continuous variable: 
corruption increases for the Retired group of governors and decreases for the Re-appointed 
group. The corresponding marginal effects are depicted in Figure 3.5. To ensure that 
the established results for retired and re-assigned governors are not driven by certain 
features of data distribution across the two groups, we additionally include the full set of 













(e) Minor/Moderate obstacle (f) Major/V.severe obstacle
Figure 3.5: Predicted probabilities of corruption levels by time dummies for Retired 
and Re-appointed governors.
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3.4.2 M eetings w ith  th e  P residen t
For further tests of our theory, we use information on personal meetings between regional 
governors and the president of Russia before the end of governors’ terms. As we argue 
above, according to our theory, governors should change their corrupt behavior after these 
meetings. Our data allows us to verify this hypothesis indirectly.
We focus on meetings that took place during the last year or two before a governor’s 
actual end of term, since these meetings are more likely to be informative for governors 
regarding their future than meetings at earlier stages of the term. Ideally, we would like 
to have in our data 1) a set of firms which operated in regions with a governor who then 
retired, 2) firms which operated in regions with a governor who then stayed for another 
term, 3) firms that were surveyed before a meeting of the corresponding governor with the 
president close to the expiration of his term, and 4) those that were surveyed after such a 
meeting. Unfortunately, we do not have sufficient observations of all of these four types, 
and thus we are limited to indirect and not fully precise, yet informative approaches.
First, there are two regions, Leningrad under governor Valeriy Serdyukov, and the city 
of Moscow under Yuriy Luzhkov. In our dataset, these governors were not reappointed, 
they met with the president within the last two years of the term, and firms operating in 
the regions were surveyed before and after the meeting (84 and 82 observations respec­
tively for the first region, and 173 and 61 observations for the second)15. According to 
our theory, firms surveyed after the meeting should perceive higher corruption than those 
surveyed before.
Since the Wald test indicates that the parallel odds assumption is likely to be violated 
for the dummy for a firm surveyed after a meeting (columns 4 and 5 of Table 3.11), 
we estimate the effect of the interest using GOLogit. The results of the estimations 
are presented in columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.5. Estimates for which the parallel odds 
assumption is violated are reported separately. For both regions, although the coefficients 
on the meeting dummy are insignificant on the intensive margin, i.e. between the states 
when corruption is "not an obstacle, minor or moderate obstacle" and when it is "a 
major or very severe obstacle", they are strongly significant and positive on the extensive 
margin, i.e. between the states when corruption is "not an obstacle" and when it is "an
15In fact, we have two more regions, the city of Saint-Petersburg and Nizhny Novgorod region, where 
firms were surveyed before and after the meeting. However, since there are only 3 firms surveyed after 
the meeting in the first case, and 4 firms surveyed before the meeting in the second case, we cannot 
perform a reliable analysis.
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obstacle" to current operations, in line with our expectations.
Second, there are several regions in the dataset whose governors had a meeting with 
the president in the last year or two (we do the analysis for both cases) of their terms 
and then retired when the term expired. In some of these regions firms were surveyed 
before a meeting (480 firms in 6 regions for the last year, and 801 firms in 8 regions for 
the last two years), while in others they were surveyed after the meeting took place (201 
firms in 2 regions for the last year, and 497 firms in 5 regions for the last two years). As 
we do not have a reason to believe that there is a correlation between corruption in a 
region, the timing of the meetings and the survey dates, the latter firms should report 
higher corruption on average. Thus, positive significant coefficients on the dummy for a 
firm surveyed after a meeting support our theory. The estimation results are presented 
in columns 3 and 4 of Table 3.5.
Finally, there are also several regions whose governors had a meeting with the president 
in the last two years of their terms and then were re-appointed for another term. Again, 
in some of these regions firms were surveyed before a meeting (1442 firms in 15 regions), 
while in others they were surveyed after the meeting (149 firms in 2 regions). Our 
theory suggests that those governors who were then re-appointed should decrease corrupt 
pressure after the meeting. A negative, although weakly significant, coefficient on the 
dummy for a firm being surveyed after a meeting is fully in line with this prediction (see 
column 5 of Table 3.5).
The Wald test results for the parallel odds assumption for the last set of tests are 
presented in Table 3.11, columns 4-8. Since they indicate that the assumption may be 
violated, we use GOLogit for the estimation.
Indeed, given the relatively small number of regions we use for these exercises, we 
cannot rule out a possibility that the observed effects are driven by differences in corrup­
tion levels, which are uncorrelated with our measures. However, the consistency of the 
predictions for different subsets of regions suggests that it is likely we captured the true 
effects. Overall, although each of the tests of our theory we implement in this section has 
obvious shortcomings arising from the nature of the data, their results are all consistent 
with each other and with our hypothesis: higher confidence in not remaining in office for 
another term forces incumbents to extract more rent and to put more pressure on local 





















Surveyed after m eeting N vs M,S 1.927** (0.805) 1.644*** (0.592) 0.764 (0.565) 1.684*** (0.434) -1.186 (0.908)
N,M vs S 0.686 (0.612) 0.175 (0.381) 0.764 (0.565) 0.317 (0.291) -2.455*** (0.869)
Foreign ownership -0.001 (0.008) -0.006 (0.006) >-0.001 (0.006) -0.003 (0.004) -0.006* (0.003)
Fem ale m anager -1.012** (0.465) 0.298 (0.333) -0.611*** (0.227) -0.365*** (0.140) -0.099 (0.126)
In (E m ploym ent) vary 0.049 (0.126) vary vary vary
ln (F irm ’s age) vary -0.194 (0.231) -0.091 (0.126) -0.005 (0.091) 0.151* (0.080)
Private 0.672 (0.464) 0.217 (0.378) vary vary vary
P erm it -0.648 (0.497) 0.362 (0.409) -0.130 (0.224) 0.031 (0.174) 0.466*** (0.168)
1st term vary vary vary
G overnor’s origin (local) vary vary
Unem ploym ent -0.690 (0.823) vary -0.224 (0.326)
ln (S ta te  officials per 1000) vary vary vary
ln(R eal G R P per capita) vary vary -1.005 (1.668)
Last, elections (U R ’s share) vary -0.058 (0.084) vary
Last, elections (Turnout,) vary vary vary
C ity size vary 0.120 (0.117) -0.092 (0.114)
Region fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes
In d u stry  fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Model X2(21)—1503*** X2(17)—901.43*** X2(39) —122*** X2(49)=201*** X2(54)=212***
Pseudo R 2 0.1178 0.083 0.0996 0.0879 0.0682
A1C 342 464 1427 2693 3309
B1C 414 529 1613 2956 3510
O bservations 166 234 681 1295 1591
R obust s tan d ard  errors in parentheses. Significance level for W ald tests (a )—0.1.
Source: A u th o rs’ calculations based on the EBRD and W orld B ank BEERS survey 
C o rrup t 3: N - no obstacle: M - m in or/m ed ium  obstacle: S - severe/verv severe obstacle 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01
3.5 C onclusion
In this paper we present evidence that the corrupt behavior of appointed politicians fol­
lows certain patterns that can be explained by political cycles. Specifically, we find that 
the corruption level perceived by firms operating in various regions of Russia is higher 
closer to the end of a regional governor’s term in office. This pattern persists after control­
ling for firm-level, regional and governors’ characteristics as well as regional, industry, and 
year fixed effects both in cross-sectional and pseudo-panel frameworks. We also perform 
several robustness checks, using different estimation approaches, model specifications and 
an alternative corruption measure, and identify a similar trend. Arguing that the estab­
lished pattern cannot be explained by the reasoning typically used to explain political 
budget cycles, we suggest that it can be decomposed into two trends in the behavior of 
two different groups of governors: those who expect to leave office once their current term 
expires and those who expect to remain in office for another term. The different trends 
are driven by different governors’ beliefs.
Our theory is that the governors from the first group should have increasing incentives 
to commit corruption over their terms, while the governors from the second group should 
have decreasing incentives. The trends come from the intertemporal choice where the 
incumbent faces the trade-off between postponing rent extraction which has increasing 
marginal cost for the next term and risking loss of office and thus being unable to extract 
rents at all: the more certain the incumbent is that he will (will not) be re-appointed, 
the stronger (weaker) are the incentives to decrease corruption now and to postpone it to 
the next term. We test this explanation using several approaches. Although, due to the 
nature of the data, the approaches we use have certain limitations, we consistently find 
evidence to support our explanation. First, we assume that those governors who were 
eventually re-appointed were more likely to expect that they would be re-appointed, while 
those who eventually retired were more likely to expect they would not be re-appointed, in 
analyzing the effect of timing on corruption for these two groups of governors separately, 
we find that corruption decreases for the first group of governors and increases for the 
second group. Second, we use meeting with the president as a proxy for the moment of 
change in governors’ beliefs regarding their likelihood of re-appointment. We find that 
governors who were eventually re-appointed commit less corruption after a meeting, while 
the effect of a meeting is the opposite for governors who were not re-appointed.
Based on our findings, we believe that there may be a need to strengthen anti-
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corruption control and accountability prior to the expiration of officials’ terms, particu­
larly for those officials who are less likely to remain in office. Furthermore, our findings 
may serve as an indirect argument against appointment systems. A system that assumes 
the direct election of regional governors by the population may create incentives for in­
cumbent candidates to decrease corruption in order to boost support from voters, which 
in turn may reduce the increased corruption when governors fear they will lose office.
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3.A A ppend ix
Table 3.6: Summary statistics: Time by oblasts.
Count Min. Max. Median Mean St.Dev. Wave
Belgorod Oblast 117 0.833 0.900 0.883 0.871 0.017 V
Chelyabinsk Oblast 90 0.267 0.750 0.333 0.392 0.164 IV,V
Irkutsk Oblast 118 0.469 0.531 0.516 0.507 0.016 V
Kaliningrad Oblast 117 0.183 0.283 0.217 0.229 0.033 V
Kaluga Oblast 128 0.233 0.847 0.367 0.451 0.206 IV,V
Kemerovo Oblast 115 0.267 0.433 0.367 0.362 0.044 V
Khabarosvk Kray 114 0.583 0.708 0.646 0.645 0.038 V
Kirov Oblast 94 0.517 0.633 0.617 0.599 0.036 V
Krasnodarsk Kray 96 0.267 0.983 0.900 0.765 0.274 IV,V
Krasnoyarsk Kray 119 0.197 0.443 0.361 0.347 0.056 IV,V
Kursk Oblast 101 0.295 0.800 0.361 0.443 0.178 IV,V
Leningrad Oblast 166 0.250 0.950 0.842 0.677 0.277 IV,V
Lipetsk Oblast 106 0.267 0.400 0.367 0.342 0.040 V
Moscow City 351 0.180 0.542 0.375 0.358 0.110 IV,V
Moscow Oblast 251 0.133 0.983 0.367 0.594 0.302 IV,V
Murmansk Oblast 106 0 0.617 0.517 0.439 0.217 V
Nizhni Novgorod Oblast 105 0.200 0.817 0.267 0.395 0.218 IV, V
Novosibirsk Oblast 159 0.183 0.333 0.250 0.243 0.038 IV,V
Omsk Oblast 116 0.850 0.967 0.917 0.908 0.035 V
Perm Kray 154 0.133 0.750 0.167 0.261 0.190 IV, V
Primorsky Kray 195 0.317 0.833 0.383 0.555 0.209 IV,V
Republic of Bashkortostan 157 0.217 0.583 0.300 0.331 0.114 IV, V
Republic of Mordovia 119 0.167 0.267 0.233 0.223 0.034 V
Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) 89 0.267 0.383 0.283 0.294 0.029 V
Republic of Tatarstan 115 0.283 0.367 0.317 0.317 0.020 V
Rostov Oblast 166 0.233 0.733 0.300 0.394 0.188 IV,V
St. Petersburg city 183 0 0.533 0.125 0.237 0.184 IV,V
Samara Oblast 151 0.233 0.867 0.800 0.703 0.220 IV,V
Smolensk Oblast 56 0.167 0.850 0.767 0.728 0.172 IV,V
Stavropol Kray 116 0.650 0.717 0.683 0.687 0.021 V
Sverdlovsk Oblast 143 0.367 0.792 0.450 0.484 0.135 IV,V
Tomsk Oblast 121 0 1 0.933 0.855 0.287 V
Tver Oblast 142 0.0328 0.433 0.131 0.140 0.092 IV,V
Ulyanovsk Oblast 111 0.100 0.217 0.167 0.162 0.041 V
Volgograd Oblast 106 0 0.393 0.0500 0.152 0.159 V
Voronezh Oblast 148 0.0167 0.983 0.533 0.601 0.190 IV,V
Yaroslavl Oblast 115 0.846 0.981 0.904 0.910 0.038 V
Total 4953 0 1 0.375 0.467 0.266
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Table 3.7: Summary statistics: Corrupt, CorSale, Time.
Count Min. Max. Median Mean St.Dev.
Corrupt (obstacle to current operations) 4953 0 4 1 1.546 1.477
CorSale (share of annual sales paid) 3319 0 0.600 0 0.012 0.0450
Time (term completion share) 4953 0 1 0.375 0.467 0.266
Table 3.8: Summary statistics: control variables.
Count Min. Max. Median Mean St.Dev.
Foreign ownership 4953 0 100 0 2.449 14.310
Female manager 4953 0 1 0 0.205 0.404
In (Employment) 4953 1.609 11.51 2.996 3.233 1.338
In (Firm’s age) 4953 0 5.165 2.303 2.319 0.696
Private 4953 0 1 1 0.850 0.358
Permit 4953 0 1 0 0.131 0.337
1st term 4953 0 1 0 0.485 0.500
Governor’s origin (local) 4953 0 1 1 0.788 0.409
U nemploy merit 4953 0.800 10 6 5.897 2.081
ln(State officials per 1000) 4953 2.398 3.524 3.105 3.105 0.246
ln(Real GRP per capita) 4953 30.58 32.81 31.49 31.518 0.422
City size 4953 1 5 3 2.850 0.833
Last elections (UR’s share) 4953 29 91.60 45 47.463 14.082
Last elections (Turnout) 4953 47.20 94.20 55.70 58.592 10.050
Table 3.9: Summary statistics: Year.
Wave Frequency Percentage Cum. Percentage
2008 IV 594 11.99 11.99
2009 IV 502 10.14 22.13
2011 V 2682 54.15 76.28
2012 V 1175 23.72 100.00
Total 4953 100.00
Table 3.10: Summary statistics: Industry.
Frequency Percentage Cum. Percentage
D: Manufacturing 1918 38.72 38.72
G: Wholesale and retail trade 1911 38.58 77.31
F : Construction 462 9.33 86.63
I: Transport 267 5.39 92.03
K: IT 153 3.09 95.11
H: Hotels and Restaurants 146 2.95 98.06





Table 3.11: Wald test for the parallel odds assumption (p-values associated with the statistic).
Overall W ald y2
(1)
Full sam ple
y 2(36) =  458.29***
(2)
R etired
y 2(14) =  10.17
(3)
R e-appointed
y 2(22) =  11.68
(4)
M iLeningrad obi.
y 2( l l )  -  6.78
(5)
M:Moscow city
X2(9) =  6.67
(6)
M :R etired ly
1 year
y 2(13) =  6.69
(7)
M :R etired 2y
2 years
y 2(13) =  10.35
(8)
M :R e-appointed 2y 
2 years
y 2(16) =  12.68
T im e (term  com pletion share) 0.1667 0.2990 0.9988
Tim e (term  com pletion share)2 0.1414 0.9594 0.5304
M eeting president 0.0727 0.0065 0.8390 0.0008 0.0853
Foreign ownership 0.5124 0.3231 0.5408 0.8319 0.2662 0.7897 0.3704 0.2598
Fem ale m anager 0.3488 0.6974 0.5168 0.7585 0.1626 0.8001 0.5311 0.8897
in (Em ploym ent) 0.0011 0.1006 0.4354 0.1233 0.1906 0.0236 0.0077 0.0899
ln (F irm ’s age) 0.1290 0.0877 0.4160 0.0980 0.9403 0.8229 0.6883 0.9529
Private 0.0001 0.0252 0.8018 0.3373 0.1493 0.0827 0.0060 0.1546
P erm it 0.0063 0.0096 0.4903 0.7021 0.9333 0.5361 0.2020 0.1348
N o n -ls t term 0.0839 0.0026 0.9482 0.0039 0.0059 0.0042
G overnor’s origin (local) 0.2058 0.0011 0.0008 0.0028 0.0002
Unem ploym ent >0.0001 0.8196 0.9887 0.8533 0.0810 0.4033
ln (S ta te  officials per 1000) 0.4004 0.0016 0.0237 0.0072 0.0009 0.0024
ln(R eal G R P per capita) >0.0001 0.5381 0.3148 0.0115 0.0028 0.8905
Gity size 0.8013 0.0984 0.7194 0.0062 0.3578 0.9058
Last, elections (U R ’s share) 0.9440 0.0017 0.0246 0.0054 0.6817 0.0301
Last, elect,inos (turnout,) 0.8740 0.0007 0.0209 0.0051 0.0013 0.0052
Year — 2009 >0.0001 0.0173 0.3244 0.3078 0.0046 0.9760 0.5502 0.1075
Year — 2011 0.0001 0.0010 0.0297 0.9 901 0.0050 0.6333 0.0292
Year =  2012 0.0010 0.0011 0.0200 0.8843 0.0051 0.0124 0.0320
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
In d u stry  fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
3.A.1 B EEPS d a tase t m ethodology
According to the survey description, the sample is representative at the regional level for
the 2012 survey wave. For the wave of 2009, the sample is representative for seven federal
districts, which are the groups of neighboring regions. More information can be obtained
from the “BEEPS -  Sampling structure, Russia 2009, 2012 surveys”: http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/i\ 
The sample for Russia was selected using stratified random sampling with three levels of 
stratification used in Russia: industry, establishment size, and region.
Regional stratification
1. IV (2009) wave - Regional stratification was defined in seven regions. These regions 
are North West, Central, South, Ural, Siberia, Volgo-Viatsky, and Far East (federal 
districts).
2. V (2012) wave - Regional stratification was defined in 37 regions (city and the 
surrounding business area) throughout Russia.
Industry stratification was designed as follows:
1. IV (2009) wave - the whole population, or the universe of the study, is the non- 
agricultural economy. It comprises all manufacturing sectors according to the group 
classification of ISIC Revision 3.1 (group D), construction sector (group F), services 
sector (groups G and H), and transport, storage and communications sector (group 
I). Note that this definition excludes the following sectors: financial intermediation 
(group J), real estate and renting activities (group K, except sub sector 72, IT, which 
was added to the population under study), and all public and utilities sectors. In 
all countries, the sample was stratified along Manufacturing, Retail trade (sector 
52) and Other services. In some of the countries, there were specific target numbers 
of interviews for more detailed sectors within these three groups.
2. V (2012) wave - the universe was stratified into eight manufacturing industries 
(food, wood and furniture, chemicals and plastics and rubber, non-metallic mineral 
products, fabricated metal products, machinery and equipment, electronics and 
precision instruments, and other manufacturing), and seven service industries (con­
struction, wholesale, retail, hotels and restaurants, supporting transport activities,
IT, and other services).
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Full sample Retired
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
Re-appointed
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1-1 s.d. m ean +1 s.d.
Figure 3.6: Kernel densities of term completion share; overall and by Retired and Re­
appointed statuses.
J.30 As I list some factors that can affect the current operations o f a business, please look at this card and 
tell me i f  you think that each factor is No Obstacle, a Minor Obstacle, a Moderate Obstacle, a Major 
Obstacle, or a Very Severe Obstacle to the current operations o f this establishment.
SHO W  CARD 21
























Tax rates j30a 0 1 2 3 4 -9 -7
Tax administration j30b 0 1 2 3 4 -9 -7
Business licensing and permits j30c 0 1 2 3 4 -9 -7
Political instability j30e 0 1 2 3 4 -9 -7
Corruption j30f 0 1 2 3 4 -9 -7
Courts h30 0 1 2 3 4 -9 -7
J.7 It is said that establishments are sometimes required to make gifts or informal payments to public 
officials to “get things done” with regard to customs, taxes, licenses, regulations, services etc. On 
average, what percent of total annual sales, or estimated total annual value, do establishments like 
this one pay in informal payments or gifts to public officials for this purpose?
Percent
Percent of total annual sales paid as informal payment j7a %
No payments/gifts are paid 0
Don’t know (spontaneous) -9
Refusal (spontaneous) -8
Figure 3.7: Questionnaire for dependent variables Corrupt(j30i) and CorSale(j7&).
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Size stratification was defined following the standardized definition for the rollout 
(both for IV and V waves): small (5 to 19 employees), medium (20 to 99 employees), and 
large (more than 99 employees). For stratification purposes, the number of employees 
was defined on the basis of reported permanent full-time workers. This seems to be an 
appropriate definition of the labor force since seasonal/casual/part-time employment is 
not a common practice, except in the sectors of construction and agriculture.
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